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1. INTRODUCTION 
The present document is a Staff Working Paper by the European Commission and is for 
information purposes only. It does not represent an official position of the Commission 
on the subjects it addresses, nor does it anticipate such a position. It supports the 
European Commission's Communication entitled "Trade, growth and development – 
Tailoring trade policy for those countries most in need". 
Its first aim is to provide supplementary information and analysis on the issue of trade 
and investment for development. This is based on the one hand on a review of the 
existing literature in this area and, on the other, on an analysis of developing countries' 
position in the world economy and global trading systems. 
Its second goal is to provide detailed background on the EU's instruments and initiatives 
to support developing countries' integration into the world economy and the global 
trading system; notably the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) – particularly 
the Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme, the GSP+ and the Commission's proposal for a 
revamped GSP; the EU's new rules of origin; the EU's Export Helpdesk; Aid for Trade; 
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries; an overview of bilateral trade cooperation with other parts of the world; 
an overview of the EU's approach to investment and EU investment-support 
mechanisms; and an overview of multilateral aspects. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The following analysis of trade and investment for development is entirely based on 
excerpts from a study entitled "Aspects of trade" commissioned by the European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation, to review the 
existing literature in this area. The present section therefore reflects the views, 
conclusions and suggestions expressed in the study, which do not necessarily correspond 
to those of the Commission. The section focuses on the following key issues: it first 
presents the main trends of the changing world economic situation and focuses 
particularly on developing countries’ integration into the world economy and the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements; it goes on to exploring the link between 
trade and development; finally, it looks into complementary policies with special 
emphasis on services, investment and competition.  
2.1. A changing world economy 
The study describes the most significant changes the world has undergone during the last 
decade: 
• A great expansion in global trade flows has taken place over the last decades. Global 
exports of goods and services grew at a real average rate of 6.3% in the period 1980 
to 2008, while GDP growth averaged 2.9% during the same period1. Although 
developed economies continue to dominate world markets, developing countries are 
                                                 
1 UN World Economic and Social Survey, 2010. 
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now new drivers of global trade: between 2000 and 2009 their exports rose by 80%, 
compared to 40% for the world as a whole2.  
• One of the most important developments in world trade in the last few years is the 
fragmentation of production of both goods and services and the associated 
development of foreign outsourcing and off-shoring3. Agricultural and industrial 
production is increasingly taking place through largely unregulated global value 
chains dominated by multinationals. Two thirds of world imports concern 
intermediate inputs. Another factor behind the observed expansion of world trade has 
been the increase in international outsourcing and off-shoring of services. Trade in 
services rose from $0.5 billion in the 1980s to an average of $2.5 billion in the 2000s. 
The participation of developing countries in global services trade rose from 19 to 
24% during the same period. In summary, trade patterns have moved from a country 
specialisation based on goods (primary commodities for the South and manufactures 
for the North) to intra-firm/network specialisation in terms of tasks, giving the South 
considerable advantage in the production of manufactures4.  
• The rise of the emerging economies – such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (BRICS) – as both economic and political actors, as for instance illustrated by 
their role in the G20, is having significant and far-reaching impact on the world 
economy. Together, they account for over 40% of the world population and 
approximately 17% of the value of world GDP5. The BRICS' trade performance has 
been well above the world average in the last decade, in terms of both exports and 
imports. Their specialisation can in some cases generate complementary effects; in 
other cases competitive effects may well create conflicts of interest among trade 
partners. BRICS can be a driving force for those economies that have complementary 
production and trade structures, because producers can benefit from the demand for 
their output from BRICS and they can be included in regional value chains.  
• The most dramatic event in this decade is the deep recession that hit the world 
economy during the 2008-2009 period. The financial and economic crisis hit trade 
hard. The fall was sudden and sharp: global trade fell by 23%. 
• The erosion of preferences due to multilateral tariff reductions is a long-standing 
concern for many developing countries and has become one of the key issues in the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. Developing countries benefiting 
from trade preferences are concerned that reductions of most-favoured nation (MFN) 
tariffs by preference-granting countries may decrease their advantages with respect to 
non-preferred competitors and result in significant export losses. Yet studies show 
that losses due to preference erosion for developing countries are, on the whole, 
relatively small: firstly, because preference margins are rather small and secondly, 
because preferences are often underused by developing countries. However, the 
literature also emphasizes that there are groups of countries and/or products for 
which this may not be the case, e.g. certain agricultural products and LDCs. 
                                                 
2 World Bank, 2011, 'Leveraging trade for development and inclusive growth', the WB Group Trade 
Strategy 2011-2021. 
3 WTO, 2008, 'Trade in a globalising world'. World Trade Report. 
4 UN, World Economic and Social Survey 2010. 
5 World Bank, 2010, World Development Indicators Database. 
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• Slow progress in the DDA negotiations has spurred developed countries, in 
particular, to pursue bilateral and regional trade agreements. The proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) –at both regional and bilateral level – in the last 
ten years has taken place at an unprecedented rate. It also involves a growing number 
of developing countries. These developments have considerable repercussions on 
multilateral governance, and could represent a menace to the functioning of the WTO 
system. Some trade experts take a pessimistic view of the latest explosion of PTAs, 
arguing that there is a link between the surge of bilateral and regional deals and the 
slow pace of the DDA. Other experts are more optimistic, suggesting that the 
proliferation of PTAs will eventually force the pace of the DDA negotiations. 
2.2. Developing countries’ integration into the world economy 
According to the study, developing countries have experienced extensive and rapid trade 
liberalisation in the last few decades, though there is room for further liberalisation. In 
this context, they have significantly reduced their tariffs, opened their services sectors, 
and embraced foreign investment, either unilaterally or in bilateral trade agreements. The 
World Bank estimates that developing nations unilaterally lowered their average tariffs 
by 14% between 1983 and 2003 independently of GATT/WTO rounds and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). The current level of tariffs in many developed countries is already 
relatively low, at least on industrial goods. On the contrary, high levels of protection still 
exist on agricultural goods and significantly affect many developing countries. Likewise, 
trade in services is subject to many barriers. Past research also suggests that upper 
middle income countries generally enjoy better market access in both developing and 
developed countries because their exports are skewed toward manufacturing. Conversely, 
low income countries face more restrictive market access because their exports have a 
higher content of agricultural products. Great attention is now paid to non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) because, as the level of tariffs has decreased, the relative importance of NTMs 
has increased. In addition, significant progress has been made in terms of quantifying the 
effects of NTMs, leading to a better understanding of the costs these barriers impose on 
doing business. Furthermore, there is some evidence of NTMs being used as a substitute 
for the now lower tariffs. 
The impact of tariff reductions on employment depends on the competitiveness of 
domestic producers and the flexibility of domestic markets, the study says. Where 
domestic production is not competitive, imports will reduce domestic production and 
employment. Flexibility in the labour and capital markets needs to be promoted in order 
to respond to new opportunities, and to provide adequate safety nets to protect the poor 
during the process of change. Since tariffs are often an important source of government 
revenue in developing countries, any significant reduction may affect a government’s 
ability to finance pro-poor expenditure such as health and education. If revenues cannot 
be sustained, alternative revenue sources must be found to replace tariff revenues. 
Whether this process of liberalisation has been associated with net gains, especially for 
developing countries, is a matter of controversy in the economic literature. While many 
countries have benefited greatly from global integration, it cannot be denied that the 
benefits are distributed unequally, both across countries and within them. Much of the 
trade dynamism of developing countries as a group is driven by Asian economies, which 
have collectively more than doubled their share of global exports since 1990. In several 
cases – i.e. China, India, and some other Asian countries – globalisation’s promise has 
been fulfilled. High-productivity employment opportunities have expanded and structural 
change has contributed to overall growth. Other regions – Latin America and Sub-
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Saharan Africa – have seen much smaller increases in market share. The very diverse 
outcomes observed suggest that the consequences of globalisation depend on the manner 
in which countries integrate into the global economy. 
Empirical analyses have shown that trade liberalisation can produce different outcomes. 
As a consequence of this, in the last decade more attention has been paid to the need for 
governments to ensure that citizens are able to benefit from the opportunities created by 
market openness: workers must be able to acquire the necessary skills; firms need to be 
able to access credit to finance profitable investment opportunities; and farmers need to 
be connected to markets. Accordingly, the focus of reforms in the developing world has 
moved from “getting prices right” to “getting institutions right”. But what kind of 
institutions should reformers strive to build? Broadly speaking, desirable institutions 
should provide security of property rights, enforce contracts, stimulate entrepreneurship, 
foster integration in the world economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, manage risk-
taking by financial intermediaries, supply social insurance and safety nets, and enhance 
voice and accountability. Because developing nations are different from developed 
countries in that they face both greater challenges and more constraints, “appropriate” 
institutions could differ from those in developed countries.  
2.3. Multiplication of preferential trade agreements 
The study points out that the number of PTAs in force in 2010 was close to 300 and 
WTO estimates that more than 400 free trade agreements (FTAs) will be in force 
globally by 20116: all WTO members (except Mongolia) belong to at least one PTA. One 
half of PTAs currently in force are not strictly “regional” in that they include countries 
from other geographical areas. It is widely acknowledged that the benefits of trade 
liberalisation are greatest if liberalisation is undertaken multilaterally. Nevertheless, 
conclusion of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations has proven elusive and 
many countries have sought more quickly realizable outcomes through bilateral and 
regional FTAs. FTAs have also been seen by many as promoting broader economic 
integration and serving foreign policy and strategic interests.  
Since average tariffs have fallen markedly in recent years, the study considers that tariff 
preferences are becoming a more minor motivation for entering into PTAs. In fact, PTAs 
are increasingly being used to promote cooperation in the areas of investment, trade 
facilitation, competition policy and government procurement, as well as wider social 
issues related to the regulation of the environment and the protection of labour and 
human rights. Furthermore, PTAs are becoming increasingly complex, in many cases 
establishing regulatory trade regimes which go beyond multilaterally agreed trade 
regulations. Reciprocal preferential agreements between developed and developing 
countries are on the increase, pointing to a decreasing reliance by some developing 
countries on non-reciprocal systems of preferences. Also significant is the emergence of 
preferential agreements amongst key developing countries which may be evidence of a 
strengthening of South-South trading patterns. 
About one half of world trade now takes place among PTA members. According to the 
WTO, PTA trade in world trade has increased from 18% in 1990 to 35% in 2008. 
Manufactures represented 65% of merchandise trade among PTA members in 2008. 
However, a deeper analysis shows that only 16% of world trade is eligible for 
                                                 
6 WTO, World Trade Report 2011. 
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preferential tariffs, the global trade-weighted preference margin amounts to no more than 
1%, and 84% of world merchandise trade still takes place on an MFN basis. Hence, 
while the number of PTAs has been increasing, the importance of preferential trade has 
not kept pace. This development reflects a substantial reduction in MFN tariffs during 
the past two decades, either through multilateral trade negotiations or unilateral 
reductions7. 
Regarding the economic impact of PTAs, the study underlines that preferential trade 
opening allows some domestic production to be replaced by imports from more efficient 
firms located in preference-receiving countries, leading to welfare gains (trade creation). 
At the same time, PTAs may reduce imports from more efficient non-member countries, 
implying a welfare loss (trade diversion). PTAs have a positive impact on welfare if trade 
creation exceeds trade diversion. In brief, two countries are more likely to sign an 
agreement if they are geographically closer, similar in size and differ in terms of factor 
endowment. 
According to the study, developing countries have contributed to the recent rise in PTA 
activity: South-South agreements now represent two-thirds of all PTAs in force and 
North-South about one-quarter. The emergence of South-South integration may also 
reflect its usefulness as a policy tool for industrialisation by facilitating the inclusion of 
LDCs in regional production networks and the export process. South-South integration 
also provides a means of strengthening developing countries’ bargaining power in 
multilateral trade negotiations and addressing region-specific issues, such as transit, 
migration and water8. 
The study points out that the characteristic feature of PTAs between developed and 
developing countries is that they are underpinned by criteria such as reciprocity and 
comprehensive trade liberalisation as opposed to the non-reciprocal systems of 
preferences enjoyed by developing countries under schemes like the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) and other unilateral initiatives such as Everything but Arms (EBA) 
under the legal cover of waivers granted by WTO members. This confronts developing 
countries with the challenge of transition from non-reciprocal trade preferences to trade 
liberalisation on a mutual basis under reciprocal PTAs with developed country partners. 
The study concludes that the proliferation of PTAs has created a spaghetti bowl of criss-
crossing arrangements, with little attention to coherence between agreements or to the 
implications of so many regimes for trade costs, efficiency, and the conditions of 
competition in global markets. The question of whether PTAs – and specifically RTAs - 
represent a WTO-plus by accelerating and extending the liberalisation process on a non-
discriminatory basis, or whether they are likely to weaken the WTO by bypassing it, is 
still open. Although liberalisation through RTAs is generally a second-best option, it may 
be the only option if there is resistance to liberalisation at the multilateral level.  
2.4. Trade and inclusive growth 
The study recalls that poverty eradication is the central focus for development: the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) commit the international community not only to 
halving poverty by 2015, but also to promoting a more open, rule-based trading system, with 
the latter goal viewed as reinforcing the former one. The role of international trade in 
                                                 
7 WTO, World Trade Report 2011 
8 WTO, World Trade Report 2011. 
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relation to poverty reduction has been highlighted in many studies. However, empirical 
evidence is not conclusive.  
According to theory, international trade helps raise and sustain growth by giving firms 
and households access to world markets for goods, services and knowledge, lowering 
prices, increasing the quality and variety of consumption goods, and fostering the 
specialisation of economic activity into areas where countries have a comparative 
advantage. Trade opportunities are important too for generating the investment and 
positive externalities that are associated with learning through the diffusion and 
absorption of technology. As a result, many developing countries have embarked on 
programmes of external economic liberalisation in recent decades. 
The effect of greater trade openness on income growth is the topic of a large body of 
applied research. A first wave of studies in the 1990s was not able to demonstrate the 
direction of causality between the phenomena under investigation, with the result that 
inclusive growth and development can be the consequences of trade liberalisation and 
integration into the world economy, rather than a prerequisite for it. Another possibility 
is that both phenomena are caused by a third factor - such as the quality of institutions. A 
second wave of empirical studies was more cautious in quantifying the actual impacts of 
multilateral trade policies on growth. Yet the lack of consensus on empirical evidence on 
the link between openness and poverty dynamics has recently led to new case studies. 
There is no simple general conclusion about the relationship between trade liberalisation 
and poverty, the study says. While there are, in principle, many causes for optimism in 
the relationship between trade liberalisation and poverty reduction, the ultimate outcome 
depends on many factors, such as the precise trade reform measures undertaken, the 
characteristics of the poor and local institutions, which determine the price effects of 
liberalisation, notably the transmission of border price changes to local levels and homes. 
Developing countries are not a homogeneous group. A comparative analysis of the 
linkages between trade, development and poverty reduction in 15 African and Asian 
countries9 derives the following key factors: i) economic growth remains the most 
significant pre-requisite for poverty reduction; ii) economic growth “per se” is not 
always sufficient to stimulate poverty reduction, while the character and distribution of 
growth plays a major role in determining the extent of poverty reduction; iii) agriculture 
remains a key activity for a majority of the poor; iv) poor business climates (e.g. poor 
infrastructure, excessive red tape, corruption, an inefficient financial sector, weak 
institutions, etc.) hamper growth and poverty reduction; v) the countries that have 
benefited the most are those that have carried out selective and gradual liberalisation and 
have continued to provide state support to a number of key economic sectors; vi) 
institutions play a key role in creating and sustaining economic growth and ensuring that 
benefits are spread as widely as possible; and vii) global competition, especially with 
developed countries, has led to the decline of many sectors. 
2.5. Complementary policies and reforms to promote development 
When trade reform has been implemented in an unstable macroeconomic framework or 
without any effort being made to strengthen trade-related domestic institutions or without 
appropriate complementary policies, it has often either been reversed or has failed to 
                                                 
9 The 15 countries under investigation are: Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, India, Kenya, Nepal, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, UK, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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stimulate growth, the study says. Determining the appropriate trade policy stance and the 
associated complementary policies for a country should consequently be part of 
designing growth policy and development and poverty-reduction strategies: 
• Institutions: On the government side, an effective and non-corrupt authority is critical 
to the success of reforms. 
• Macroeconomic and exchange rate policies: A stable macroeconomic environment 
and a truly competitive exchange rate are crucial in order that trade liberalisation is 
sustained and can contribute to an efficient allocation of resources.  
• Competition policies: By lowering external barriers to international competition and 
by reducing government-imposed barriers to entry by domestic firms, it is possible to 
increase the competitiveness of markets. Competition among private firms is also 
important.  
• Infrastructure: Improving the quality of infrastructure is of primary importance for 
developing countries. Infrastructure plays a key role in LDCs' performance, e.g. road 
density, the telecommunication infrastructure, electricity infrastructure, etc. 
• Safety nets: One of the most important complementary policies for the poor is an 
efficient social safety net. All trade policy reforms need to consider the potential 
hardships faced by the poor in activities that are opened up to foreign competition. It 
is preferable to employ general, country-wide safety nets to deal with problems 
linked to trade reform, rather than to establish distinct trade-related safety nets. 
• Foreign direct investment (FDI) and intellectual property protection: FDI is an 
important channel of technology transfer across national boundaries. Hence, it is 
important that FDI involves labour-intensive production and the transfer of skills 
through training. Improvements in communications, transport, and information 
technology, together with trade liberalisation, have led companies to locate the 
labour-intensive parts of production in developing countries. Effective intellectual 
property regimes can promote FDI and technology transfer in sectors that 
substantially rely on intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
• Establishing business: If trade liberalisation opens up business opportunities in new 
areas, new businesses are likely to be required. Regulations for establishing these 
activities should thus not be restrictive. 
The type and speed of reforms to accompany trade liberalisation process is also an 
important issue. According to the study, two main strands of literature are available, 
opposing proponents of “shock therapy” and those of “gradualism”, particularly in the 
1990s. Shock therapists argued that rapid liberalisation avoids painful and costly periods, 
when the old centrally planned economy was no longer working and the new market one 
was not yet working. They advocated a policy package consisting of rapid and extensive 
privatisation of state-owned enterprise, liberalisation of prices and trade, and adoption of 
fiscal austerity policies. Gradualists called instead for a more cautious approach to 
reforms, and objected to the elimination of the old regulations and institutions before the 
new ones are created, warning that the institutional vacuum could have a devastating 
impact on output.  
 11 
The study adds that the success of trade reform policies is also dependent on timing. 
Determining the appropriate pace of reform can have both political and financial 
implications. For example, rapid implementation removes distortions quickly, providing 
clear price signals to facilitate further adjustment, but at higher short term cost than a 
gradualist approach. A gradual approach gives the government more time to explain the 
reforms to its citizens, as reforms can be perceived as threatening.  
Trade liberalisation policies in developing countries often occur in conjunction with 
other macroeconomic reforms, the study says. The sequencing of reforms refers to the 
order in which these macroeconomic reforms are introduced, both across sectors and 
within them. While most observers believe that there are substantial welfare gains to be 
reaped by giving freer play to market forces, many have concluded that there are 
problems inherent to the transition process itself that argue against liberalizing all 
markets simultaneously. 
2.6. Services 
The study emphasises that modern economies are increasingly dominated by services, 
and that with growth and development, services form an increasing share of overall 
production and employment. Over the last three decades, services have grown from 
roughly 58% of GDP to almost 75% across the OECD10 . But the sector is also important 
for developing countries. In Latin America, for example, services accounted for 66% of 
value added in 2007, up from 49% in 1977. Similar trends can be seen in other regions. 
Even in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been a marked shift in value added toward the 
service sectors.  
Increasing evidence suggest that services play a crucial role in productivity growth in 
general and that services liberalisation is a major potential source of gains in economic 
performance. At the same time, trade in services may lead to off-shoring and may place 
pressure on wages in high-income countries, though the empirical research has not yet 
produced unequivocal conclusions on off-shoring of labour.  
Empirical research also point to positive linkages in developing countries between 
service sector openness and growth. Research into the impact of changes in services 
policy on economic performance over the period 1990-2004 for a sample of 20 transition 
economies found that changes in policies towards financial and infrastructure services, 
including telecommunications, energy and transport, are highly correlated with inward 
FDI. They conclude that services policy reform explains the post-1990 economic 
performance of transition economies. Given that developing countries tend to have more 
restrictions on foreign competition, there is a significant potential growth bonus for 
developing countries that move from closed regimes toward open regimes. 
According to the study, liberalisation of the services sector entails the reduction or 
elimination of prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, and regulations that prohibit FDI, 
limiting the share of ownership of foreign firms, limiting the number of expatriates that 
can be employed, or restricting imports of a particular service. The potential implications 
of trade liberalisation in services are closely tied to the mode of liberalisation and to 
underlying market structures. In fact, while both privatisation and more competition lead 
to significant improvements in performance, a comprehensive reform programme 
                                                 
10 François, J., and Hoekman, B., 2010, 'Services trade and policy', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.48, 
pp. 642-92. 
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produces the largest gains. The sequence of reform also matters. Consequently, opening 
services markets involves a broad and complex set of policies, regulatory instruments, 
institutions and constituencies, domestic and foreign, public and private.  
Experience demonstrates that the nature, pace and sequencing of regulatory reform and 
liberalisation undertakings must be carefully assessed. Some specific regulatory tools 
might be useful in this regard. Prior consultation can contribute to the development of 
better regulation, providing more information on all the available options. Insights gained 
through prior investigation of the experiences of other countries could also be useful in 
designing and sequencing domestic reforms. However, such regulatory tools also imply 
significant administrative costs. The study also points out that trade agreements may 
deprive regulators of the ability to achieve social objectives. The challenge would be to 
achieve a balance between greater competition and preserving desirable regulatory 
freedom. 
The complexity of service sector reform, and the critical need for liberalisation efforts to 
be not only rooted but also accompanied, and in some instances preceded, by sound 
regulation (including enforcement capacity) can present formidable challenges to 
developing countries, the study concludes. This points to the need for services 
liberalisation to be progressive, and to be accompanied by regulatory capacity building. 
2.7. Investment 
The study notes that neoclassical theory predicts a positive relationship between capital 
inflows and growth. Therefore, the theory generally favours open or liberalised capital 
markets, with the expectation of more efficient allocation of savings, increased 
possibilities for diversification of investment risk, faster growth and the dampening of 
business cycles. The new structural economics approach considers that FDI is a more 
favourable source of foreign capital for developing countries than other capital flows 
because it is usually targeted toward industries consistent with a country’s comparative 
advantage. It is less prone to sudden reversals during economic crises. In addition, FDI 
generally brings technology, management, access to markets, and social networking, 
which are often lacking in developing countries and are crucial for industrial upgrading. 
Thus, liberalising FDI investment is considered an attractive component of a broader 
development strategy.  
According to the study, while there is little evidence of a clear relationship between 
capital inflows and growth, FDI is believed to be one of the most important channels 
through which financial globalisation benefits the economy. Since the mid-1980s, most 
developing countries have opened their markets to FDI, trying to benefit from the 
development input that these investments can generate for host countries. The process of 
opening up to FDI and establishing enabling frameworks for FDI vastly accelerated 
during the 1990s and continues today.  
FDI flows into host countries are determined by a variety of factors, the study says. 
Firms choose the investment site that minimizes the cost of production. Determinants 
include the physical and technological infrastructure of the host country, and the cost and 
quality of resources, together with inputs and business facilitation measures, such as FDI 
promotion, including incentives to foreign investors. The riskiness of investment in terms 
of the economic and political environment also affects investment decisions. In this 
respect, greater macroeconomic and political stability of the host country could attract 
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more foreign investment. Host country institutions also influence investment decisions 
because they directly affect the conditions in which businesses operate. 
The OECD identified ten broad policy areas where host country policies affect 
investment decisions: investment policy, investment promotion and facilitation, trade 
policy, competition policy, tax policy, corporate governance, policies for promoting 
responsible business conduct, human resource development policy, policies related to 
infrastructure and financial sector development, and public governance11. 
The study concludes that one primary condition for attracting FDI is the adoption of an 
investment liberalisation policy. A key challenge for governments consists in identifying 
and eliminating unwanted barriers to entry. However, FDI liberalisation is a necessary 
but not a sufficient host country determinant of investment, and other determinants have 
to come into play if investment is to flow into a country. If a host country does not have 
some basic economic determinants in place it is unlikely that promotional efforts or 
incentives will be successful in attracting significant FDI.  
2.8. Competition 
The study points out that competition policy is the combined effect of all government 
policies that influence the level of competition as a positive tool regulating the market 
economy, including measures against restrictive business practices and unfair business 
practices. An important objective of competition policy is to enhance consumer welfare 
by promoting competition. Economic efficiency is generally enhanced by encouraging 
competition.  
According to the study, one of the key links between competition policy and growth has 
been the role that competition policy plays in increasing economic efficiency: the main 
static effects of competition are to reduce the ability of firms to raise price above 
marginal cost and to ensure that firms produce at the lowest costs; the dynamic 
consequences of competition can include incentives to innovate, to imitate, and to invest 
in the development of new technologies and know-how. However, a key aspect of 
achieving a successful reform process is the promotion of consistency and coherence 
between competition, industrial, trade, and investment policy regimes. Thus, policies to 
promote and protect competition are now prominent on the national policy agendas of a 
number of emerging economies, e.g. China, Vietnam and India. 
 
3. THE POSITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
While Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as a category are distinctly defined by the 
United Nations (UN)12, there is no established convention for the designation of 
"developed" and "developing" countries. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and 
the USA in Northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are 
considered "developed" regions or areas. The World Bank classifies low income 
                                                 
11 OECD, 2006, 'A policy framework for investment: Investment promotion and facilitation'. 
12 Currently, Gross national income per capita, Human Asset Index and an Economic Vulnerability Index 
are used to classify countries as least developed. In addition, low income countries with population larger 
than 75 million inhabitants do not qualify for inclusion in the group of least developed countries (LDCs). 
For more information, see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/.  
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countries ($1,005 per capita or less) and lower-middle-income countries ($1,006 - $3,975 
per capita) as developing countries (calculated using the World Bank Atlas method), but 
acknowledges that this does not imply that all economies in these groups are 
experiencing similar levels of development13. 
The present analysis is based on the EU's definition of developing countries in the 
current Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) regulation and defines the group of 176 
countries eligible for the GSP as "developing"14. In this group, a further differentiation is 
established between G20 developing countries15 and the LDCs.16 The need for 
differentiation was highlighted in the Commission's on-line public consultation on trade 
and development carried out between June and September 201117. Respondents agreed 
that emerging economies are no longer developing countries, though also noting that they 
may still face particular constraints that need to be taken into account.  
The rest of the section briefly describes the evolution of developing countries over the 
past decade in terms of changes in per capita income and poverty; their trade 
performance, including trade in services and changes in flows and stocks of foreign 
direct investment. 
3.1. Per capita income has increased 
Figure 1 shows the change in developing countries' gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita over the past decade. Most of the increase in per capita income is driven by the 
G20 developing countries. The cumulative increase in their GDP per capita over the 
period stands at 115%. The relative increase in GDP per capita was largest for China at 
223% and Russia at 310%. This positive trend seems to continue. In its twice-yearly 
update,18 the World Bank forecasts that developing economies would grow by 6.3% in 
2011, down from 7.3% in 2010, and maintain 2011 growth levels for the next two years. 
LDCs have benefited somewhat less. The increase in per capita income of the LDCs 
reached 88% over the period. The gap between developing countries and LDCs has thus 
further increased. However, some LDCs have seen a more positive development than 
others especially due to a boom in exports of oil and minerals. Between the beginning of 
the decade and mid-2008, the total volume of exports from the LDCs almost doubled, 
with African LDCs leading this expansion. Hence, while GDP per capita for African 
LDCs grew from $357 to $640 between 2000 and 2008, the increase was limited to $280 
to $436 for non-oil exporters but soared from $806 to $1,854 for oil exporters (Angola, 
                                                 
13 In contrast to the World Bank, the UN distinguishes between countries with high human development 
(developed countries) and developing countries (cf. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Chapter2_reprint.pdf). This is, however, not an established 
convention and is therefore not pursued here. 
14 The definition of Developing Countries for the purpose of GSP is different from and much broader than 
the OECD/DAC list of recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The OECD list, even though 
it does not contain a definition of developing countries as such, is significant because only assistance to 
those countries, including the categories of LDCs, LICs, Lower MICs and Upper MICs qualifies as ODA 
and thus counts towards the target of 0.7%/GNI that the EU has committed to achieve by 2015. 
15 The G20 is an economic forum consisting of 20 of the world's largest economies, including the 
European Union. Its developing country members are: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. 
16 Currently 48 countries are recognized as being least developed, see http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ 
17 For more information see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=156 
18 Global Economic Prospects, 2011. 
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Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan)19. This compares to an increase of $327 to $624 for all 
LDCs over the period and $1,288 to $3,165 for all developing countries. 
Figure 1:  Developing countries' evolution of GDP per capita (€ thousand, current prices) 
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Source: IMF  
Poverty has decreased, but unevenly across countries and regions 
The increase in GDP per capita has been accompanied by a reduction in absolute poverty 
between 1990 and 2005.20 The number of people living on less than $1.25 a day dropped 
from about 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 2005. The corresponding poverty rate 
dropped from 46 % to 27 %. Despite the economic and financial crisis in 2008/2009, 
exacerbated by the food and energy crisis, sustained growth in developing countries, 
particularly in Asia, is keeping the world on track to reach the poverty-reduction MDG 
target of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty.21  
                                                 
19 UN Secretary General Report on "Ten-Year Appraisal and Review of the Implementation of the Brussels 
Programme of Action for the Least-Developed Countries for the decade 2001-2010". 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/ldc/shared/documents/Ten-Year%20appraisal.pdf 
20 Data is patchy and there exists no comprehensive data on poverty ratios across countries later than 2005.  
21 See UN MDG Report 2011, p. 6-8 
(http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2011/11-
31339%20%28E%29%20MDG%20Report%202011_Book%20LR.pdf.). Based on projections from the 
World Bank, it is now expected that by 2015 the global poverty rate will fall below 15 %, well under the 
23 % target. Projections for sub-Saharan Africa forecast that the extreme poverty rate in the region will fall 
below 36%. Still, there are hardly any figures on poverty reduction in a country such as India (five 
observations since 1960s out of which only two since 1989).  
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Using the $1.25 a day poverty line reveals a reduction in absolute poverty for a set of 
selected countries and country groups (Figure 2), including remarkable reductions in 
absolute poverty in Asia, notably in China and Indonesia where poverty was cut by more 
than half between 1990 and 2005. In relative terms, poverty has also fallen markedly in 
Argentina and Brazil, while in sub-Saharan Africa absolute poverty did not decrease to 
the same extent.22 
Figure 2:  Headcount poverty ratio, $1.25 poverty line (%) 
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Source: World Bank, POVCAL and the OECD Development Centre. Note: Data is not available for 2000 
or for later than 2005 for a cross country comparison. Data for India is note available for 2002. 
However, the $1.25 poverty line is a very crude measure of poverty and does not 
necessarily reflect human development. Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and 
is characterised not only by income, but also by access to health services, education etc. 
A poverty indicator that seeks to take into account several dimensions of poverty is the 
Human Development Index (HDI). This indicator (Figure 3) points to a significant 
increase in development for all selected countries over the past 20 years. The only 
exception is Sub-Saharan-Africa which saw its HDI decline between 1990 and 2000 
before increasing to a higher level in 2010. In this respect, it is significant that the 
African LDCs that experienced the highest GDP per capita growth over the last decade 
remain at the lower end of the HDI with a respective ranking out of 169 countries of 119 
for Equatorial Guinea, 146 for Angola, 156 for Sudan and 163 for Chad23. 
Trade policy reform has both direct and indirect effects on the poor. In terms of direct 
effects, trade policy reform may affect the demand for poor people's labour and other 
assets they own and thus have an impact on their income. It also changes the price of 
                                                 
22 Data for the LDCs is missing. 
23 See htt.44p://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
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what they consume. The indirect effects are more long-term and operate through changes 
in incentives to invest and innovate which will improve the prospects for higher 
economic growth in the future.  
Figure 3:  Change in human development index (1 is developed) 
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Source: UNDP, POVCAL and the OECD Development Centre. 
But the poverty impacts of a trade policy change will vary significantly across countries. 
The poor in different countries consume and produce different goods and are not subject 
to the same set of regulatory regimes, infrastructure, market structure, etc. Therefore, the 
impact of trade reform will be channelled through different transmission mechanisms in 
each country and influence individuals and households differently. Hence, the answer to 
whether the poor will benefit or not from global reforms is specific to countries and 
individuals.  
3.2. Developing countries, including the LDCs, are trading more  
Figure 4 shows that developing countries' trade steadily increased from the beginning of 
the period until it dipped in 2009 due to the financial crisis. Developing countries were 
particularly affected by the crisis because of falling commodity prices, reduced exports 
and tourism earnings and declining capital flows and remittances. The crisis caused a 
drop in the value and volume of trade for almost all developing countries.  
Trade of the ten developing G20 countries makes up a significant share of the developing 
world's exports (about a third). Among the G20 countries, the largest increases in exports 
are accounted for by China and India (increasing exports by 307% and 214% 
respectively). In contrast, Mexico's exports increased by a mere 37%. 
The relative increase in LDCs' exports between 2002 and 2010 (not clearly discernable in 
Figure 4) is larger (198%) than the increase in exports of the developing world as a 
whole, which reaches 150%. However, in contrast to the rest of the developing world, the 
LDCs remain net-importers. 
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Figure 4:  Developing countries' trade performance (€ billion, current prices) 
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A fair share of the increase in developing countries' exports is made up of mineral fuels 
which have experienced a boom in prices. This has benefited in particular Kuwait, 
Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia24. The surge in commodity prices 
over the period is therefore one reason for the successful trade performance of 
developing countries. On the other hand, the growth in Chinese exports comes from 
manufactures, more specifically machinery and transport equipment. 
Other main exports of developing countries are electrical machinery (HS85) and 
machinery and mechanical appliances (HS84) making up 18% and 11% of developing 
countries total exports, respectively. But the largest increases in exports concern products 
traded in relatively small quantities such as copper (HS74), which increased by 352% 
over the period. 
Reflecting the above, developing countries have increased their share of world exports 
over the period examined. The figure for developing countries as a whole points to an 
increase in the share of world exports from 41.0% to 51.5%, while the share of world 
exports of the developing G20 countries increased from 20% to 30%. The LDCs 
increased their share of world exports from 0.8% to 1.3% (Table 1). 
Table 1:  Share in world exports (%): 
 2002 2010 
Developing countries 41.0 51.5 
G20 developing countries 20.5 29.7 
                                                 
24 Increasing exports in mineral fuels by 277%, 252%, 198%, and 183% respectively. 
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LDCs 0.8 1.3 
EU27 17.4 15.3 
USA 15.6 10.6 
Japan 9.1 6.6 
Rest of the World 16.9 16.0 
Source: IMF 
The developing countries' increasing share of world exports is also reflected in a larger 
share of exports of manufactured goods exported, in particular from China. Exports of 
manufactured goods might have increased even more and export diversification might 
have progressed even further had the prices of mineral fuels not surged so substantially. 
However, in case of the LDCs, dependence on a few export products, particularly 
primary commodities, increased during the past decade. In fact, the increase in LDC 
exports is concentrated in a subset of countries and one may note that LDCs' dependence 
on a few export products, particularly primary commodities, has increased during the 
past decade. Chad increased its exports by 2980%25, while Zambia, Angola, and 
Equatorial Guinea increased their exports by 429%, 378% and 238% respectively. This 
increase is mainly due to the increase in the global demand for oil (Chad, Angola and 
Equatorial Guinea) and raw materials (copper in the case of Zambia) and high 
commodity prices.  
On average, three main export products make up more than 75% of all their exports, 
while in eight LDCs this proportion is higher than 95%. The overall increase in export 
concentration has been essentially due to trends in African LDCs, particularly the oil 
exporters among them. At the same time, the share of manufacturing in GDP has been 
stagnant thereby making it difficult to talk about a structural transformation in LDCs. 
Still, some progress has been recorded by Asian LDCs, driven by their specialisation in 
low technology manufactures, primarily textiles, for instance Bangladesh and Cambodia.  
3.3. South-South trade has outstripped North-South trade since 2007 
Trade between developing countries (South-South trade) is growing in importance. In 
2007, South-South trade was for the first time more important than trade between 
advanced and developing economies (Figure 5). G20 developing countries account for 
most of this increase, as trade between the developing world and G20 developing 
countries (including trade among the G20 developing countries themselves) increased by 
265%.  
EU27 trade with developing economies increased more (97%) than total North-South 
trade (69%), while the increase in United States' trade with developing countries was 
lower at 36%. Trade between Africa, excluding intra-African trade, and the developing 
world as a whole, increased by 234% (not displayed in the graph). However, with 3.5% 
of the total, Africa still makes up only a small share of trade among developing 
economies. 
The EU accounts for about 16% of the LDCs' trade and is their second most important 
trading partner after China with a share of close to 22% of LDC trade. In 2009, the EU 
was the world's leading importer of LDCs' agricultural products with 32% of the total 
(compared to 15.6% for India and 11.6% for China) and of LDCs' textile and clothing 
                                                 
25 Starting from a relatively low export value of €65 million in 2002.  
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products with 51% of the total (compared to 32% for the USA). However, with 13% of 
fuel exports from LDCs, the EU comes after China (34%) and the USA (23%). 
Figure 5:  Overview of developing countries' trade (import and export) by main partners  
(€ billion, current prices) 
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Note: South-South trade denotes trade between developing countries.  
Trade barriers between developing countries are still much higher than barriers between 
developed and developing countries. Kowalski and Sheperd (2006)26 found that tariff 
barriers facing South-South trade are almost three times higher than North-South or 
North-North trade barriers. Hence, there is potentially more scope to further increase 
South-South trade through tariff liberalisation compared to North-South Trade. Regional 
integration can be decisive in this respect, but one should note that the form regional 
integration takes may differ from one region to another.  
The relative importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is increasing as regular tariff 
barriers are gradually being lowered. Some developing countries have made significant 
progress in reducing these barriers, which hinders not only trade but business activity 
more generally. According to the World Bank's and the International Finance 
Corporation's "Doing Business Indicators", reforms making it easier to do business were 
implemented in 36 of 46 in Sub-Saharan African economies in 2010/2011. In terms of 
the overall ranking of 183 countries, Mauritius is in 23rd place ahead of several EU 
member states. Rwanda, an LDC which is in 45th place, has made significant progress 
over the past five years in terms of complying with export formalities (time halved) and 
streamlining the time required to register a company (time reduced by 83%). Also 
neighbouring Burundi and Uganda show progress in this respect.  
                                                 
26 Kowalski, P. and B. Shepherd (2006), “South-South Trade In Goods”, OECD Trade Policy Working 
Papers, No. 40, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/314103237622 
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3.4. Growing importance of trade in services 
Trade in services has become more important over the last decade, partly because 
technological progress in information and communication technology has allowed a 
rising share of intermediate services in total trade. Consequently, worldwide trade in 
services now makes up nearly 12% of GDP (Figure 6). The worldwide share of services 
trade in GDP grew by 48% between 1980 and 2009. This especially concerned India 
whose share of services in GDP increased from some 3% to more than 12% over the 
period. Low- and middle income countries as well as LDCs also increased their share of 
services trade in GDP, albeit less dramatically than India. The same holds true for the EU 
and other high-income OECD countries. In contrast, the relative importance of trade in 
services of the Latin American and Caribbean countries (not shown in the graph) 
declined. 
Figure 6:  Trade in services (% share of GDP) 
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Source: IMF 
Disaggregated data on trade in services is still patchy, but it is more recent and 
comprehensive than the poverty data. The data indicates that LDCs27 on average import 
more commercial services than they export (not shown in Figure 6). They mostly import 
transportation services and export travel services (53.3%), transportation services 
(23.5%) and other commercial services, which include transactions such as construction, 
computer and information, and other business services (23.2%)28. However, these figures 
mask great heterogeneity amongst LDCs. While the share of commercial services is 
                                                 
27 Based on WTO data for Bangladesh, Benin, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Tanzania 
(http://stat.wto.org/ServiceProfile/WSDBServicePFHome.aspx?Language=E ). 
28 2007 WTO Report on "Market access for products and services of export interest to LDCs 
(http://www.mdg-trade.org/WTCOMTDLDCW41_english.pdf). 
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insignificant in oil-exporting African LDCs, it is important in other LDCs (e.g. 49% in 
Ethiopia, where the bulk of services is related to transportation), or even prominent in 
many small island developing countries that have an important tourism sector (e.g. 90% 
for Samoa). 
Liberalisation of trade in services can be an important part of a developing country's 
growth strategy and could especially benefit those low-income and LDCs which have so 
far not succeeded in reaping the full benefits of trade. The potential development impact 
of service liberalisation is significant and estimated welfare benefits for service 
liberalisation are higher than for goods and agriculture liberalisation.29  
To a certain extent, however, the effects of trade liberalisation in services can be 
achieved through internal liberalisation of services. This conclusion may be drawn from 
a study carried out by the World Bank (WB) of four major road transport corridors in 
Africa that cut across borders and ship goods to the ports. In all the four transport 
corridors, the pure vehicle operating costs along these major corridors were no higher 
than in France. Profit margins were by contrast exceptionally high, particularly in Central 
and West Africa, where they reach 60 to 160%.30 The underlying cause is limited 
competition combined with a highly regulated market. Competition in the trucking 
industry could thus lower costs dramatically. Rwanda deregulated the trucking industry 
and transport prices fell 75%.31 
3.5. Worldwide investment has increased with almost half going to the 
developing world 
Worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows decreased over the last decade in 
Euro terms (while it increased in dollar terms) and suffered a further blow in 2009 due to 
the financial crisis (Figure 7). On the other hand, FDI flows into developing countries 
increased by 54% between 2000 and 2008. Moreover, FDI inflows into developing 
countries suffered less from the financial crisis, indicating more stable investment 
prospects. Worldwide FDI flows decreased by 44% between 2008 and 2009 while FDI 
inflows into developing countries decreased by a mere 36%.  
FDI inflows into developing countries are now nearly as large as inflows into the EU, 
USA, and Japan together. In 2009, FDI inflows into developing countries equalled €343 
billion, while FDI inflows into the EU, USA and Japan equalled €361 billion. While 
developed countries on average invest more abroad than they receive, the contrary holds 
true for developing countries. 
Figure 7:  FDI inflows by destination (€ billion, current prices) 
                                                 
29 M. Cali, K. Ellis, D. te Velde (2008), "The contribution of services to development and the role of trade 
liberalisation and regulation.", ODI Working Paper 298. 
30 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia (eds) (2010), Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 
31 Interview with Shanta Devarajan, World Bank chief economist for Africa at 
http://www.theafricareport.com/archives2/interviews/3296754-interview-shanta-devarajan-world-bank-
chief-economist-for-africa.html  
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Source: UNCTAD 
FDI inflows into G20 developing countries increased by 118% between 2000 and 2009, 
largely due to growth in Saudi-Arabia, Russia, and Turkey. However, the increase of FDI 
into the South-American countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) was below average. 
FDI inflows in LDCs witnessed an exponential growth from €5 billion in 2000 to €21 
billion in 2009 (390% growth). Most of the inflows were directed to natural resource-rich 
African LDCs, though a number of island LDCs also received growing inflows of FDI.  
FDI from emerging economies in LDCs, especially from China and India, is now 
growing faster than from traditional partners. There has, for instance, been a significant 
increase in infrastructure investments from Asian countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Intra-
African FDI, 70% of which originates from South Africa, is smaller in scale and is 
directed more to services and manufactures, rather than to natural resources32. 
The trend in FDI flows is reflected in FDI stocks with the total amount of foreign 
investment increasing. This development is to a large extent attributable to an increase in 
the FDI stock of developing countries as the world stock of FDI increased by 31% and 
reached some €12,500 billion in 2009 (not shown in Figure 8), while the stock of FDI in 
developing countries increased by 53% to about €3,500 billion.  
In the group of developing countries, the developing G20 countries experienced a growth 
in FDI stocks of 75% attaining a level of foreign investment of €3,000 billion. The least 
                                                 
32 UN Secretary General Report on "Ten-Year Appraisal and Review of the Implementation of the Brussels 
Programme fo Action for the Least-Developed Countries for the decade 2001-2010". 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/ldc/shared/documents/Ten-Year%20appraisal.pdf 
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developed countries also increased their FDI stocks above average growing from €42 
billion to €94 billion (82% growth). 
Figure 8:  FDI stocks by destination (€ billion, current prices) 
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Source: UNCTAD 
3.6. A mixed picture 
To conclude the above analysis, it is clear that the benefits of growth and trade remain 
unequally spread across developing countries. Developing G20 countries remain the 
main beneficiaries of globalisation. Some of them managed to capitalise on high export-
led growth so as to achieve significant poverty reduction.  
However, despite apparently impressive figures overall, the situation of LDCs has not 
improved significantly in the last decade. Where GDP per capita and trade has grown 
significantly, this has been in most cases led by a surge in oil and commodities exports in 
a very limited number of countries, and the benefits have overall not resulted in lifting 
people out of poverty. This is largely due to structural factors, such as an insufficiently 
diversified economies and export bases, poor infrastructure and the lack of productive 
capacity, but also political factors linked to lack of good governance, poor administrative 
capacity and lack of security and stability. This is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which is home to most LDCs, while some more positive trends can however be 
witnessed in Asia and the Pacific. 
Nevertheless, some non-oil/commodity exporting Sub-Saharan African countries have 
done well over the past decade. Partly as a result of a coordinated government 
programme to stimulate and improve exports of agricultural products, such as coffee, and 
to attract tourism, Rwanda has experienced an average annual increase in exports of 19% 
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over the last decade33. This performance is also reflected in high rates of economic 
growth and a steady improvement in its human development index. Another example is 
Cape Verde which reached middle-income country status in 2007, the success of which 
can primarily be explained by good macroeconomic management and governance 
including progressive trade openness and integration into the world economy.  
 
4. THE EU'S GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) 
In 1968, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
recommended the creation of a 'Generalised System of Tariff Preferences' under which 
developed countries would grant trade preferences to all developing countries. The EU 
was the first to implement a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme in 1971 in 
order to extend preferential access to its markets to developing countries.  
4.1. The EU's current GSP – since 2006 
The EU's GSP is the most widely used of all developed-country GSP systems. In 2009, 
EU imports under the GSP totalled € 59.6 billion. The GSP scheme is implemented in 
10-year cycles so that it can adjust to the changing environment of the multilateral 
trading system. For this purpose the Commission adopts guidelines on the role of the 
GSP for a 10-year period. 
The 1994 guidelines34 for the 10-year period 1994-2005 and their implementing 
regulations introduced a number of important changes in the GSP such as tariff 
modulation according to product sensitivity, graduation and special incentive schemes. In 
2001, a special arrangement for LDCs was introduced, for an unlimited period of time: 
the Everything but Arms (EBA) arrangement, which provides duty-free, quota-free 
access for all products from all LDCs except arms. 
In 2004, the Commission adopted guidelines for the following 10-year period 2006-
201535. One of the objectives for this period was simplification of the scheme, which has 
been achieved through a reduction in the number of arrangements, from five to three. 
Thus as of 2006 GSP schemes consist of:  
i. The general arrangement, which provides autonomous preferences to all developing 
countries and territories;  
ii. The Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance, known as the GSP+, which offers additional tariff preferences 
references to support vulnerable developing countries in their ratification and 
effective implementation of relevant international conventions relating to sustainable 
development. These include basic human rights (agreements designed to uphold 
political and economic and social rights, combat torture and discrimination on 
grounds of race and gender, and protect women’s and children’s rights) and labour 
rights (the ILO eight fundamental conventions related to the freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining, equal treatment, as well as elimination of 
                                                 
33 WTO (2011), Market access for products and services of export interest to least-developed countries, Note 
by the secretariat, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/51. 
34 COM(1994) 212 final. 
35 COM(2004) 461 final. 
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forced labour and child labour). They also cover environmental protection (e.g. 
conventions designed to combat trafficking in endangered species and to protect the 
ozone layer) and the various conventions relating to the fight against illegal drugs 
production and trafficking);  
iii. EBA, which maintains its global coverage of everything but arms. Several positive 
mentions of the GSP were made in the Commission's on-line public consultation, 
particularly on GSP+ and EBA.  
The present 10-year cycle, which began in 2006, will finish in 2015. The first GSP 
scheme of the present cycle, established by Council Regulation (EC) No 980/200536, 
entered into force on 1 January 2006 and expired on 31 December 2008. To ensure the 
continuity of the GSP scheme, a new Regulation covering the period from 1 January 
2009 to 31 December 2011 was adopted by the Council on 22 July 2008 (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 732/2008), replacing Regulation (EC) No 980/2005. It extends for a 
further three years the three separate arrangements of the scheme. At the same time, this 
regulation implemented a number of technical changes in the scheme, either to simplify 
the language or to take account of changes in relevant trade data over the most recent 
period. In addition, for countries which did not yet meet the GSP+ qualifying criteria, the 
new regulation provided an additional opportunity to apply for the additional preferences 
in mid-2010. 
4.2. The next GSP – as of 2013 
In view of the approaching expiry of the present 10-year GSP cycle and the preparation 
of the successor GSP scheme, the Commission undertook a major evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the GSP scheme. This was conducted for the Commission by the Centre 
for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS)37. In parallel public 
consultations were carried out with Member States and other stakeholders, including 
civil society, industry, beneficiary countries, the European Parliament and WTO 
members38.  
In general, the consultations underlined the importance of the scheme for its users. 
Almost all respondents agreed that the scheme was a valid trade instrument for 
developing countries. Respondents from different beneficiary countries confirmed that 
the scheme had played an important role in the expansion and diversification of their 
trade sector. However, about half of the respondents, representing different types of 
stakeholders, stressed the need for modifications covering: stronger control and 
verification of requirements to ensure that preferences go to countries in need; support 
for investment in developing countries; competitiveness of EU industries; and focus on 
abolishing restrictions in international trade and lowering custom duties and other 
barriers.  
The analysis undertaken by CARIS concluded that the scheme has been generally 
successful. Imports benefiting from preferences were significant and amounted to almost 
€60 billion in 2009. This corresponds to over 9% of total EU imports from all 
beneficiaries. This percentage varies across categories of beneficiaries with preferential 
                                                 
36See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:211:0001:0039:EN:PDF 
37 CARIS report: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf 
38 Public consultation report: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=142 
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imports accounting for 8% of total imports from GSP countries, 20% of total imports 
from GSP+ countries, and 32% of total imports from EBA beneficiaries. The general 
attractiveness of the scheme is also underlined by a relatively high level of utilisation of 
the available preferences, but with room for further improvement, of 53% for GSP 
countries, 69% for EBA countries and 85% for GSP+ countries. 
With respect to the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good 
governance, CARIS concluded that the GSP+ arrangement had had a positive impact on 
the ratification of GSP+ related conventions. However, the instrument was not fully 
equipped to clearly monitor progress in the effective implementation of the relevant 
conventions, although some GSP+ beneficiary countries had undertaken substantial 
reforms. 
Based on the CARIS analysis and the results of public consultations, the Commission 
carried out a thorough impact assessment39. On 10 May 2011, the Commission adopted 
its proposal for the new GSP Regulation40. The Regulation will apply as of 1 January 
2014. The Regulation, after approval by the Council and the EP, will be published six 
months in advance of the date of application. The main objectives of the proposed 
Regulation are to: (i) better focus on those countries most in need; (ii) further promote 
core principles of sustainable development and good governance; and (iii) enhance legal 
certainty, predictability and stability. 
 
5. THE EU'S NEW PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN 
In respect of the EU's 2002 commitment to “pay particular attention to LDCs and other 
low income countries”, a key achievement was the adoption, at the end of 2010, of the 
new preferential rules of origin which have been applicable within the framework of the 
GSP since 1 January 2011. This adoption concluded a process of consultation initiated in 
2003 and designed to address criticism regarding the previous rules, considered too 
stringent to allow developing countries to really benefit from the preferential market 
access offered by the EU. A correlation was indeed proven between the stringency of the 
rules of origin and the utilisation rates of the tariff preferences. In addition, product-
specific rules were considered too complicated. Lastly, compliance was considered too 
costly and burdensome, both for exporters and administrations. 
The new rules are simpler and easier to comply with. They offer extended possibilities of 
sourcing through flexible product specific rules and new opportunities of cumulation. 
Regional cumulation is maintained and enhanced. In addition, the system of derogations 
from the rules of origin has been made easier to apply for. Last, a procedure is introduced 
allowing the EU to rapidly grant derogations on its own initiative, in order to be able to 
respond more quickly to any special situation which may occur, such as natural disasters. 
A specific effort was made to assist LDCs, which benefit from further flexibilities. For 
the first time, the EU has introduced differentiation for the benefit of LDCs at the level of 
applicable GSP rules of origin. For example, for most industrial products, the threshold 
                                                 
39 Impact assessment:  
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2011/sec_2011_0536_en.pdf 
40 Proposal for a new GSP Regulation: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147893.pdf 
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of valued added requested in the LDCs is only 30% (as against 50% for non-LDC). For 
textile and clothing, single transformation has been granted without quotas.  
Trade and natural disasters 
The increasing costs of natural disasters have led to growing interest in their impact on trade. 
Direct potential effects include casualties but also physical damages to infrastructure and 
disruptions of supply chains, international trade and economic activity. The Commission has 
contributed to the reflection on this issue through the organisation of an internal seminar on 
'Natural disasters in poor and vulnerable countries' on 25 May 2011. On this occasion, 
participants discussed methodologies for assessing disaster risk and impact, as well as the 
strengthening of vulnerability indicators by including trade-related measures, and criteria for 
eligibility for trade support. This was followed by a Commission in-house econometric analysis 
which suggests that, on average, exports of developing countries with a population of up to 20 
million fall by 22% after a major natural disaster, with the negative effect on export performance 
lasting about three years.  
 
This new set of rule is more operator-friendly. From 2017, for example, exporters will no 
longer have to go to the authorities for a certificate of origin 'Form A' for each 
consignment. Instead, they would register with authorities (who would remain 
responsible for controls) and once registered, issue statements of origin themselves 
directly to their customers in the EU.  
This set of rules is – or will be – used as a point of reference during ongoing and future 
FTA negotiations.  
Within the framework of EPA negotiations, the EU has proposed a far-reaching 
initiative, allowing greatly extended possibilities of cumulation. Under Cotonou, all ACP 
countries were allowed to cumulate materials with each other, but when the Cotonou 
agreement, ended, cumulation between EPA partners and other ACP countries was 
possible only when the applicable rules of origin were the same, so in practice, for some 
products, only within the same EPA. This condition prevents cumulation between ACP 
countries which have signed different EPAs, and between EPA countries and ACP 
countries that have not signed an EPA. With the new proposal, EPA partners would be 
allowed to cumulate materials coming from any country in the world, as long as these 
materials are entitled to enter the EU duty free quota free (DFQF), either because there is 
a 0% duty in the EU's conventional custom tariff or a 0% GSP preferential duty. In 
addition, cumulation would also be possible, upon request, for industrial products 
entering the EU DFQF under an FTA. It is expected that the increase of foreign sourcing 
allowed by these new cumulation opportunities could result in an increase of EU 
preferential imports from EPA countries of between 2.9% and 7.2% (with foreign 
sourcing increasing respectively by 10% and 25%). About 45% of the increase in EPA 
exports is estimated to be in agricultural products and 55% in industrial products. 
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6. THE EU'S EXPORT HELPDESK 
In 2004, the Commission launched the Export Helpdesk as a flanking measure to the 
preferential trade arrangements granted by the EU to developing countries41. It is a free 
online service providing information for economic operators in developing countries on 
the conditions of access to the EU market. This website provides detailed information 
product-by-product and country-by-country on EU import requirements (SPS, technical 
regulations, labelling rules, etc.), internal taxes, import tariffs and import measures, rules 
of origin, customs procedures and trade statistics. 
Since its inception in 2004, the Export Helpdesk has been available in 4 languages 
(English, French, Spanish and Portuguese) so as to reach as many users in developing 
countries as possible. In order to further assist exporters in countries in the 
neighbourhood region, the website was extended in 2010 to include Arabic and Russian. 
In 2010 the Export Helpdesk counted over 1,750,000 hits worldwide indicating its 
usefulness for economic operators around the world. The largest category of user 
countries is in Latin America, followed by Asia.  
The Export Helpdesk also offers a Contact section allowing users to submit all kinds of 
questions related to access to the EU market. The Contact section receives an average of 
60 questions per month, with more than 50% of them coming from companies.  
Feedback received from users indicates that after 7 years of operation, the Export 
Helpdesk has clearly established itself as a unique one-stop-shop for all those who wish 
to know more about the conditions of access to the EU market.  
Today the Export Helpdesk is increasingly seen as a template to be copied by other 
regions, e.g. in the context of a new trade facilitation mechanism now being developed 
for the Euro-Mediterranean area.  
 
7. AID FOR TRADE 
Many developing countries, particularly the LDCs, face difficulties in their efforts to 
adapt to a fast changing world where trade is becoming increasingly competitive and 
global, and integration into global supply and value chains is a necessity. Constraints 
exist at domestic level, notably in LDCs, including limited productive capacities, limited 
access to state of the art technologies, a weak private sector, and lack of institutional 
capacities (notably of national administrations). This in turn poses challenges in terms of 
the design or implementation of trade and accompanying policies and in trade 
negotiations, as well as in meeting technical and SPS requirements.  
In line with the fundamental principles of national ownership and leadership, the bulk of 
efforts rests on developing countries themselves. However, the international community 
also recognises the role of Aid for Trade (AfT) in contributing to establishing the right 
conditions at national and regional level to help developing countries integrate into the 
global trading system. On this basis, the EU has been a long-standing proponent and 
                                                 
41 See http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/index_en.html 
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leading provider of AfT. The Commission's on-line public consultation on trade and 
development confirmed the importance of AfT and highlighted the need for 
mainstreaming trade into developing countries' national and regional development 
strategies, demand-driven programmes, and ownership. 
7.1. EU Aid for Trade Strategy 
EU Commitments 
The 2007 EU Aid for Trade Strategy pursues the following objectives:  
-  Increase Aid for Trade as part of the gradual increase in the EU's overall ODA. 
-  Implement the commitment by EU Member States and the European Commission to 
collectively spend €2 billion annually on Trade-Related Assistance by 2010, including €1 
billion from Member States and €1 billion from the Commission. In the range of 50% of the 
collective increase would be available to ACP needs. 
-  Enhance the pro-poor focus and the quality of EU Aid for Trade. 
-  Increase EU-wide and Member States' capacity in line with the globally agreed aid 
effectiveness principles. 
-  Build upon, foster and support regional integration processes through Aid for Trade, including 
within the ACP countries. 
-  Support effective Aid for Trade monitoring and reporting.  
 
AfT gained considerable momentum in the last decade in terms of both AfT volumes and 
the concept of AfT itself, now firmly anchored in the global trade and development 
landscape. The EU played a major role in stimulating the debate on AfT and its inclusion 
in the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005. The EU has also been a 
frontrunner in prioritising AfT, notably through the adoption by the EU and its Member 
States on 15 October 2007 of a joint AfT Strategy. Its aim was to support developing 
countries, particularly LDCs, to better integrate them into the rules-based world trading 
system and to use trade more effectively towards the overarching objective of eradicating 
poverty in the context of sustainable development. It provides for a dual and 
complementary focus on more resources to AfT and a greater impact of AfT. 
The EU Strategy addresses supply side constraints related to productive capacity, 
economic infrastructure and trade related adjustments, so that developing countries can 
benefit fully from open trade. More specifically, the EU Strategy embraces the full AfT 
agenda, which can be divided into six categories: (1) trade policy and regulations; (2) 
trade development; (3) trade-related infrastructure; (4) building productive capacity; (5) 
trade-related adjustment; and (6) other trade-related needs, notably regional trade 
integration. Categories 1, 2 and 6 correspond to more narrowly focused ‘Trade-Related 
Assistance’ (TRA). TRA plus the remaining categories are referred to as ‘the wider Aid 
for Trade agenda’, designed to benefit trade in a broader sense. The OECD/DAC tracks 
ODA in each of the AfT categories through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS). 
As with all EU aid, EU AfT is delivered in accordance with the principles of the 2005 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, which 
notably entails alignment, harmonisation, predictability, mutual accountability and 
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transparency, policy dialogue, needs assessments, results-orientation, inclusion of 
priorities into national and regional development strategies (such as Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers), and formulation of response strategies on this basis. This is the only 
way to ensure national ownership, coherent programmes and sustainability. In addition to 
and consistent with the joint AfT Strategy, several EU Member States have adopted 
specific AfT strategies in line with their national development policies. 
In the G20 context, the EU committed to at least maintaining, beyond 2011, AfT levels 
that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008), as well as to strengthening 
the role of South-South trade cooperation and reinforce the involvement of the private 
sector, while sustaining aid flows to other sectors. The EU also committed to engaging 
fully in the ongoing processes of relevant institutions, in particular the WTO, OECD, 
World Bank and other multilateral and regional development bodies, to monitoring these 
commitments and evaluating their impact on low income countries' capacity to trade.  
7.2. Significant progress has been made in terms of aid flows 
The EU and its Member States have made continued progress in AfT and have fully met 
their commitment to provide €2 billion annually as TRA. The 2010 EU AfT Monitoring 
Report showed some extraordinary collective progress, and this year's AfT Monitoring 
Report42 confirms that this was not an isolated result.  
• Collective EU AfT amounts are significant and continue growing, AfT reached €10.5 
billion in 2009, up from €10.3 billion in 2008, €7.1 billion in 2007 and €6.5 billion in 
2005 (Figure 9). The AfT concept has widened over the years to include more 
general support for infrastructure and productive sectors, whereas the original scope 
of AfT did not stretch far beyond TRA, i.e. assisting beneficiaries to formulate and 
implement trade policies. While the 2010 report indicated an all-time high of 
collective EU AfT commitments in 2008, the latest data for 2009 show that this high 
level was sustained. The 2009 commitments increased slightly (+3%) and reached a 
total of almost €10.5 billion, including €7.15 billion from EU Member States and 
€3.35 billion from the EU (European Commission). Collectively, the EU accounted 
for about 37% of total AfT from the world’s bilateral and multilateral donors in 
2008-2009 and is the largest provider of AfT. This is a substantial increase compared 
to 2004-2005, when the EU's collective share was 30% of the total. 
• AfT as a whole has remained a priority in development cooperation for the EU and 
its Member States. Measured as a share of total Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), AfT represented about a fifth of total ODA from the EU in the period 2005-
2009. The share of Aft in total EU ODA increased to 22% in 2009.  
Figure 9: Collective EU Aid for Trade(EU and EU Member States) in million Euro 
                                                 
42 The "Aid for Trade monitoring report 2011" is part of the Communication on "Enhancing EU 
Accountability on Financing for Development towards the EU Official Development Assistance Peer 
Review" (vol. IV) COM(2011) 218 final of 19.04.2011.  
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Source: OECD CRS Database, Doha Development Database, Monterrey Questionnaire 2011 
Sustainable trade project boosts exports of Uganda's organic products: 
Favourable climatic conditions and an enabling business environment have made Uganda a 
leading African producer and exporter of organic products. A Danish-funded project has 
contributed to consolidating this trend. African Organic, a certified Ugandan organic and fair 
trade producer, and Danish wholesale company Solhjulet, have set up a partnership with a view 
to increasing sales of organic fruits and vegetables in Europe that meet EU organic standards. 
The Danida Business to Business Programme started funding the partnership in 2006, providing 
around €400,000 worth of support. The supply chain and the African Organic business are now 
self-sustaining and enjoying growth – with exports amounting to around €1.3 million a year – 
and a diversification of the products shipped to Solhjulet. African Organic, a farm to the north of 
Kampala, works with over 150 smaller farmers as suppliers. The placement of products in 
premium markets means that farmers and their workers are paid a higher price. They have also 
received training in organic farming methods. 
• The EU and its Member States have fully met and even surpassed their commitment 
of providing €2 billion in TRA annually by 2010. The EU's collective total in these 
essential subcategories of overall AfT reached almost €3 billion in 2009, well above 
the target (Figure 10). Last year's monitoring report showed that the EU and its 
Member States had already met and exceeded their collective TRA target with €2.4 
billion worth of support in 2008. TRA supports developing countries in designing 
and implementing trade policies and agreements, stimulating trade by domestic firms 
and encouraging investment in trade-oriented industries. The increase is mainly due 
to an increase in EU Member States' TRA, from €1.36 billion in 2008 to €2 billion in 
2009. The strong increase of Member State support in 2009 is a result of a near 
doubling of contributions to Category 2 "Trade development" which represented 
close to 90% of total Member States' TRA commitments in 2009. In contrast, the 
EU's TRA was almost evenly split over the TRA categories in 2008 and 2009. 
• Disbursement levels were particularly high, with almost 80% of total collective EU 
AfT commitments being translated into disbursements in 2009 in. 
Figure 10: Collective EU Trade Related Assistance (EU and EU Member States) in million Euro  
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Public-private partnership for sustainable production and trade in Côte d'Ivoire: 
Cocoa is the backbone of the economy of Côte d’Ivoire, providing an income to six million 
people. Yet the sector is affected by low wages for many cocoa farm workers and instances of 
child labour and child trafficking. In addition, cocoa farmers face a number of challenges, 
including low productivity, pests and diseases and quality problems due to inadequate 
processing. In response to this situation, a public-private partnership was set up by the 
multinational Kraft Foods, the cocoa trader Armajaro and the German and US development 
agencies to introduce sustainability standards in the cocoa produced by small farmers and to 
bring certification into mainstream cocoa production. It did so by creating a supply line of 
'Rainforest Alliance Certified' cocoa and pioneering sustainable cocoa production for the 
international market. Kraft Foods uses this certified cocoa in its premium chocolate brands. The 
private partners committed themselves in advance to purchasing all cocoa that met the required 
quality. This gave farmers the security to invest time and money in improved production 
technology. Over the project's three-year lifespan, from 2006 to 2009, some 5,600 farmers from 
six cooperatives were trained, thus leading to productivity gains for farmers using sustainable 
practices of 49.5 %. More of the cocoa marketed was of a better grade and thus received a higher 
price, which in turn meant a higher income for farmers. The project has been judged such a 
success that its model has been rolled out in Ecuador, Ghana and Nigeria. 
• ACP countries benefited from increased AfT and TRA (Figure 11). As regards AfT, 
collective EU commitments to ACP countries increased by 18% in 2009, reaching a 
new all-time high of €3.6 billion. Again, the overall increase can mainly be attributed 
to increasing commitments in regional programmes (more than doubling from €0.4 
billion in 2008 to €0.9 billion in 2009), while commitments to bilateral programmes 
remained stable at €2.7 billion. Total EU TRA commitments to ACP countries 
reached €1.16 billion in 2009, almost triple 2008 levels. 
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Figure 11: EU Aid for Trade to ACP Countries (EU and EU Member States) in million Euro) 
 
• Growing attention is being devoted to Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa received the largest share of both collective EU AfT and collective 
EU TRA in 2009. Sub-Saharan Africa received some €2.9 billion worth of AfT in 
2009, or 29% of the total, up from €2.2 billion in 2008 (Figure 12). As indicated in 
Figure 13, Sub-Saharan Africa is also the main recipient of collective EU TRA, 
which increased substantially between 2008 and 2009, from €281 million to €818 
million. Sub-Saharan Africa thus took over Asia (€670 million in 2009) as the main 
recipient of EU TRA. The share of Sub-Saharan Africa in collective EU TRA 
increased from 15% to 28% between 2008 and 2009. 
Figure 12: Aid for Trade by OECD Region (EU and EU Member States) in EUR million 
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Figure 13: Trade-Related Assistance by OECD Region (EU and EU Member States) in EUR million 
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7.3. Only a limited share of Aid for Trade is channelled to LDCs 
• The share of EU AfT to LDCs is only about 22% of the total (Figure 14). Despite the 
apparent trade-related needs of LDCs, the EU and its Member States allocate 
relatively less of their ODA to AfT to LDCs than to other developing countries43. The 
share of collective EU AfT to LDCs as a percentage of the total remained relatively 
stable at 22% in 2009, slightly down from 24% in 2008. LDCs accounted for €2.3 
billion in 2009, compared to €7.8 billion for non-LDCs. The LDC share of EU AfT 
has been continuously higher than that of EU Member States.  
Figure 14: Aid for Trade to LDCs (EU and EU Member States) in EUR million 
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43 Based on information received from EU Delegations and EU Member States in January 2010 through 
the joint EU Aid for Trade Monitoring questionnaire. Out of 113 EU Delegations, 77 provided a formal 
reply. 60% of those are established in ACP countries (i.e. 46 countries), 14 in Asia, 13 in Latin America 
and 4 in Neighbourhood countries. The sample includes 32 LDCs. 
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Vietnam: trading its way out of poverty: 
In the five years leading up to January 2007, when Vietnam joined the WTO, the EU supported 
the country with two Multilateral Trade Assistance Programmes (MUTRAP I and II) worth €8.2 
million. These programmes funded a variety of technical assistance studies and helped Vietnam 
accelerate the complex process of WTO accession. Building on these two programmes, the EU 
supports Vietnam's post-WTO accession phase through MUTRAP III, which helps the country 
implement its responsibilities in the areas of competition and trade policy, notably the 
implementation of its WTO accession commitments, multilateral trade negotiations, and 
implementation of regional integration and free trade agreements. The total cost of the four-year 
programme, which got underway in 2008, is estimated at €10.7 million, including a contribution 
of €0.7 million from Vietnam. MUTRAP I, II and III have helped to promote Vietnam as a full 
member of the international trade community. Largely thanks to legal and economic stability 
brought about by the WTO accession reforms, Vietnam is now enjoying a considerable increase 
in FDI. Working with the government and other stakeholders – the private sector, universities and 
research institutions –has been a key to the success of these projects. 
7.4. Quality has improved but there is room for further progress 
Some 16 EU Member States44 and the European Commission responded to the 2011 
OECD/WTO AfT Questionnaire seeking information on the progress achieved by 
individual donor countries with a particular focus on outcomes of AfT strategies and 
programmes. The main findings were the following:  
• There has been improvement in the quality of the AfT provided by the EU and its 
Member States, bringing it increasingly in line with the Paris Declaration, notably 
regarding the availability of trade needs assessments, increased national coordination 
processes in partner countries, as well as better coordination and harmonisation with 
EU Member States and non-EU donors.  
Leveraging the regional dimension to boost Caribbean integration in global trade: 
Caribbean trade performance is constrained by a narrow production base and high infrastructure 
cost leading to high production costs and low levels of competitiveness. To help remedy this 
situation, the EU provided €6.8 million between 2008 and 2010 to the Caribbean Export 
Development Agency – CARIFORUM's regional export development and trade promotion 
agency – to provide training and technical assistance to Caribbean businesses. On this basis, 
Caribbean Export provided grants to 197 companies and business support organisations, 50 
training and technical assistance events for companies in high potential niche sectors and support 
to business and trade promotion organisations. It also supported CARIFORUM in elaborating a 
strategy to create an enabling environment for trade and export development at regional level. A 
key added value of the project was its regional approach, which allowed to take advantage of 
economies of scale in the provision of services aimed at strengthening export capacities in the 
region and allowed to build regional knowledge and networks. Another element of success was 
the choice of a funding mechanism allowing Caribbean Export to use its own procedures to 
implement the project rather than those of the donor. 
• However, further improvements are necessary, notably regarding developing 
countries' capacity to define trade related priorities in collaboration with key 
stakeholders. There are still countries where the EU and its Member States appear to 
                                                 
44 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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provide AfT in the absence of a comprehensive trade needs assessment (40% of 
responses to the AfT Questionnaire). 
• While the EU devotes a considerable amount of financial resources to regional 
integration, results in this area can be strengthened further. Some barriers that should 
be overcome include: the lack of an expressed demand for regional AfT; lack of 
coherence between national and regional priorities; lack of credible lending 
authorities at regional level; lack of effective coordination at regional level; 
difficulties of monitoring and evaluation at regional level; lack of credible mutual 
accountability mechanisms at regional level. Another problem, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa, is the low absorption capacities of Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) and low ownership of the integration process by partner countries. In many 
partner countries, there appears to be much room for strengthening the support to 
regional integration. Regional priorities for AfT were rarely considered and 
addressed in the national development strategies, and in many cases no programmes 
on regional AfT priorities are funded45. 
EU support to the International Trade Centre (ITC):  
The European Commission plans to provide support to the ITC to fund a redeveloped Data and 
Market Analysis Tool for low income countries over the period 2011-14. A first phase would 
cover the launch of a re-developed Market Access Map application (MAcMap) and enable 
immediate free access for all LDCs and developing countries. The wider objective of this project 
is to increase global trade and tariff transparency. The project acknowledges the increasing 
recognition that trade and development are inextricably interlinked but that there are many 
constraints in developing countries that must be addressed before they can fully benefit from the 
global liberalisation of trade – one key  constraint being the lack of knowledge and tools for 
analysing export markets both in commercial and technical terms. The project would contribute 
to addressing this constraint. 
• The private sector is insufficiently involved in the development and evaluation of 
AfT projects. It can also contribute leverage finance. For instance, the EU-Africa 
Business Forum provides a major platform for discussion amongst the EU, the Africa 
Union (AU), RECs and the private sector on issues closely related to AfT. It sets an 
example that could be duplicated in other regions. 
• In line with the principles of aid effectiveness in the EU’s own effectiveness agenda, 
coordination among EU donors as well as with non-EU donors requires further 
improvement. In particular, there is significant potential for more joint AfT between 
the EU and its Member States. In fact, EU Delegations responding to the AfT 
Questionnaire indicated that a doubling of joint activities was possible.  
Sharing South-South expertise to cut red tape at customs: 
Trade in Central Asia suffers from its distance from the sea and the heavy burden of bureaucracy. 
Until recently, a trader in Kyrgyzstan had to fill in 15 or so forms and collect up to 20 signatures 
to gain official permission to import and export goods. A so-called single window for pre-
customs procedures is widely recognised as one of the most effective ways to reduce non-tariff 
barriers to trade, making it possible to fill-in the necessary documentation, pay fees and receive 
the necessary certificates through a single internet portal. When the Kyrgyz government began 
researching how to implement such a system, it found that a simple but effective system 
                                                 
45 EU Questionnaire. 
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established in Senegal was the most appropriate for use in Central Asia. Consultants from 
Senegal subsequently visited Central Asia to share their knowledge of designing and 
implementing such a system. A German-funded programme, 'Three-Party South-South 
Cooperation', got underway in 2005 to help eliminate unnecessary administrative barriers to trade 
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and reduce technical barriers to trade. The 
€16.5 million worth programme aims to ensure that at least two-thirds of customs declarations in 
three of the four states can be carried out though a single window or a similar time-saving 
procedure by 2014. The introduction of the single window is expected to increase trade volume 
in the region, attract FDI, create more employment opportunities and ultimately lead to poverty 
reduction. Since 2007, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have already reduced by 60 % the number of 
forms that need to be completed to carry out foreign trade and are now committed to 
implementing a pre-customs single window. Uzbekistan has said it will implement a window by 
2015 and Kazakhstan is studying the issue. The project is a good example of three-party co-
operation, involving know-how transfer from an African country. 
• Further work on monitoring and evaluation with international organisations and 
partner countries would strengthen our knowledge and understanding of the impact of 
AfT. The impact of the EU’s support can be increased in a number of ways, 
including: 
o Strengthened results-based management in AfT programmes. By setting out 
clearly at the outset what are the objectives, it would be easier to learn lessons 
about what works and what doesn’t, allowing programmes to be adjusted to 
increase their impact even further. Aid effectiveness principles are particularly 
relevant here. 
o Continued efforts to measure impacts, particularly outcomes. Attributing final 
impacts to a specific programme is a methodologically very challenging area – 
not only in the area of trade, but for ODA in general.  
o Building more on the capacity of developing country governments to assess 
whether the focus and implementation of their own trade development strategies 
are appropriate or need to be adjusted. This is vital to ensuring our support has a 
real impact over the longer term.  
7.5. The Enhanced Integrated Framework  
Launched in 2006, the EIF pursues the following objectives:  
- Create a genuine partnership among LDCs, donors, multilateral bodies and other development 
partners. 
- Mainstream trade into LDCs' national development strategies; 
- Set up structures needed to coordinate the delivery of trade-related technical assistance.  
- Build capacity to trade, which also includes addressing critical supply-side constraints. 
 
The Integrated Framework (IF) for TRA to LDCs was established in October 1997 at the 
High-Level Meeting on LDCs' Trade Development held at the WTO. It has helped 
prepare trade needs assessments, and supports capacity building. Transformed into the 
Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) after its 2005 review, this AfT partnership 
involving LDCs, donors and international organisations (UNDP, ITC, UNCTAD, WTO, 
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World Bank), supports LDCs in becoming more active players in the global trading 
system by helping them tackle obstacles to trade. EIF activities are financed through the 
EIF multi-donor Trust Fund. While the EU was not a donor to the original IF, it has 
committed a total of €10 million (€4 million in 2008 and €6 million in 2010) to the EIF. 
To-date, a total of €3.2 million has been disbursed by the EC to the Trust Fund Manager.  
The European Commission plays an important role in this initiative, having taken a seat 
on the Board for 2009-2011 as one of the three donor representatives, and acting as 
Donor Facilitator in more than 10 LDCs. It is also one of the larger donors to the EIF. It 
has strongly focused the EU's support to the EIF, arguiing for a programme that is 
designed to avoid duplication or substitution and is well integrated in existing 
mechanisms and structures. Its focus has also been more on Tier 1 programmes 
(diagnostic trade integration studies) than Tier 2 programmes (specific sector activities to 
build trade-related and supply-side activities), where funds should typically be 
channelled through the usual bilateral cooperation mechanisms at national level rather 
than through a vertical fund. 
The EIF is considered an important potential tool to assist LDCs, placing trade issues 
more firmly on their development agenda by improving national capacity to diagnose and 
address trade constraints. The Commission recently conducted a survey based on a 
Questionnaire on AfT46 which revealed that one of the major constraints on increased 
AfT is the low capacity in partner countries for identifying needs and priorities – which 
is one of the core areas of support under the EIF.   
As the EIF became really operational only in the course of 2010, it is too early to draw 
firm conclusions on the results of the EIF but the Commission's conviction is that the 
approach taken by the EIF to seek maximum country ownership is the right one. 
Improving quality standards to boost Bangladesh's export trade: 
Bangladesh has traditionally been reliant on the export of a narrow range of goods, principally 
garments, textiles and foodstuffs. In an attempt to diversify the country’s production and export 
base, the EU supported the Bangladesh Quality Support Programme (BQSP) with the aim of 
helping the private sector understand quality and packaging requirements in export markets and 
to apply the value chain approach to enhance competitiveness. Under the programme, which ran 
from 2006 to 2010 with an EU contribution of €10 million out of €13.5 million, the 
competitiveness and innovation of the textile and garment industry was improved by 
strengthening institutions such as the National Institute of Textile Training Research and Design 
and the BGMEA Institute of Fashion and Technology. The testing and controls on frozen fish 
exports, particularly shrimps, were brought in line with international export standards. The 
programme contributed in setting up a National Metrology Institute in 2009, which ensures the 
accuracy and traceability of various products, from foodstuffs to engineered goods. It also 
initiated the setting up of the Bangladesh Accreditation Board, which works to ensure that the 
country’s certificates are internationally recognised. In addition, the Bangladesh Standards and 
Testing Institute was strengthened.  
                                                 
46 EU Delegations and EU Member States’ embassies in 89 partner countries across the developing world 
completed the Field Questionnaire in 2011 – up from 77 responses in 2011. In 61 cases, the responses 
were prepared jointly by the EU Delegation and EU Member States providing bilateral AfT in the partner 
country concerned. In the remaining cases, the EU Delegation completed the questionnaire on its own. 
 40 
8. THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (EPAS) 
8.1. Origins of the EPAs 
In 1996 the Commission47 concluded that trade preferences had not been sufficient to 
enhance ACP export growth and diversification. ACP countries had not taken advantage 
of all the opportunities offered by the EU preferences and their poor trade performance 
was reflected in a falling market share in the EU: from 7% under the first Lomé 
Convention to barely 3%. What was needed was a more comprehensive approach with a 
view to creating favourable conditions for diversification, exports, investment and 
growth. If ACP policy, capacity and governance shortcomings are properly addressed, 
the trade potential of these economies is significant. Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) were and still are designed in this perspective. 
The Cotonou Agreement stipulated in Article 37(1) that new trading arrangements should 
be negotiated and put in place before the expiry on 31 December 2007 of the Cotonou 
trade regime, covered by a WTO waiver since 2001. Thus, the EPAs aimed at 
establishing new WTO-compatible trade arrangements to support the regional integration 
of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to foster their smooth and gradual 
integration into the world economy. 
On this basis, the 2002 Trade and Development Communication developed a number of 
guiding principles for the agreements: EPAs were to establish a partnership with mutual 
rights and obligations; they were to support existing regional integration initiatives; they 
were to build on the rules of the WTO; and their design should provide for flexibility to 
take account of ACP constraints and capacities in order to become a genuine 
development tool. 
Negotiations started in 2002 at the all-ACP level to allow ACP countries and the EU to 
establish the principles of the agreements. As of 2003, negotiations continued at the 
regional level, for which ACP countries had grouped together into seven regions, based 
to a large extent on existing regional economic communities: five in Africa, and one each 
in the Pacific and the Caribbean.  
8.2. Situation at the end of 2007 
By the end of the deadline of 31 December 2007, only the Caribbean region had 
completed negotiations for a comprehensive regional EPA. In other regions, the EU and 
some or all of its regional partners agreed to conclude WTO-compatible interim EPAs 
mainly covering at least trade in goods and other areas for which negotiations had been 
concluded. The interim EPAs were expected to become stepping stones to inclusive 
regional and comprehensive EPAs, as negotiations continued on outstanding trade-
related areas with all ACP countries48.  
The Caribbean EPA combines totally free market access for Caribbean goods and 
unprecedented access for their services with improved rules of origin, provisions on 
trade-related issues, including transparency in government procurement and chapters on 
social and environmental issues and related capacity-building measures. The EPA also 
includes asymmetric, progressive obligations, and safeguards to take account of the 
                                                 
47  Green Paper (COM(96)570 final of 20 November 1996 )  
48 The only exceptions are : Timor-Leste, Somalia and  Eq. Guinea (suspended since 200x) 
 41 
different levels of development between CARIFORUM countries and the EU. It supports 
building a stable and predictable regional market where barriers to trade and investment 
are gradually removed to create better opportunities for growth and sustainable 
development.  
The interim EPAs with countries and regions in Africa and the Pacific are more limited 
in scope and address mainly trade in goods and some related areas such as trade defence, 
technical barriers to trade or trade facilitation and, in most cases, link up with a 
development chapter. 
The EU adopted in December 2007 a Market Access Regulation (MAR) offering ACP 
that had concluded their negotiations, effective duty free quota free (DFQF) market 
access for their exports to the EU. The EU set up this arrangement with a view to 
avoiding trade disruption, in advance of provisional application of the interim EPAs, on 
the understanding that these processes would be completed "in a reasonable period of 
time". As a result, ACP countries' trade relations with the EU are either covered by: (i) an 
EPA, where provisionally applied49; (ii) the Market Access Regulation advancing EU 
application of EPAs not yet applied50; (iii) the GSP (general arrangement, GSP+ or 
EBA); or (iv), in the case of South Africa, the Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement. 
Table 2: State of play of EPA agreements: 
Status Agreement Comments 
Cariforum Signed on 15 October 2008 and approved by the EP 
on 25 March 2009. Provisionally applied. 
Agreements under 
implementation 
Pacific Signed by the EU and Papua New Guinea on 30 
July and by Fiji on 11 December 2009. EP ratified 
on 19 January 2011. EU ratification completed by 
Council on 15 Feb 2011. PNG also ratified so this 
EPA entered into force. 
Signed agreements approved 
by the EP 
Côte d'Ivoire Signed on 26 November 2008 and approved by the 
EP on 25 March 2009.  
Cameroon Signed on 15 January 2009. 
SADC Signed by the EU and by Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland on 4 June 2009. Mozambique signed the 
agreement on 15 June 2009. 
Namibia has indicated it is not ready to sign.  Signed agreements 
ESA Signed by the EU and by Madagascar, Mauritius, 
the Seychelles and Zimbabwe on 29 August 2009. 
Seychelles have ratified, Madagascar declared 
provisional application. 
Comoros and Zambia have not yet signed. 
Signature pending  Ghana Ghana and European Community signature arrangements are pending.  
Signature put on hold 
EAC EAC has indicated it is not ready to sign the iEPA 
 
                                                 
49 The following countries have moved towards application of their EPA: 15 countries in the Caribbean 
except Haiti; Papua New Guinea; Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles.  
50 In addition to the 18 countries in the previous footnote, another 18 countries have initialled or signed 
EPAs but are not applying them 
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Those ACP LDCs51 that have remained out of an EPA benefit from DFQF access to the 
EU under EBA, whereas the 10 ACP non-LDCs52 that opted to remain outside EPAs 
benefit from the EU's regular GSP. 
8.3. State of play in 2011 
Negotiations continued after 2007, but progress was slow and none of the six regional 
negotiations has been closed. While in some regions (in particular SADC and West 
Africa), negotiations have been taking place more regularly, in others (Central Africa, 
EAC, ESA, Pacific) engagement was often intermittent and the rhythm of negotiations 
slower, in particular after 2009. In addition, as a result of the increasingly long time 
period between reaching the interim deals and their signature and application, some ACP 
regions identified issues in their existing interim EPAs on which negotiations were re-
opened. All in all, negotiations have advanced only sporadically although good progress 
was made forging solutions to some of the outstanding issues, in particular in 2010-2011, 
as a result of deeper efforts on the EU side to keep the process on track. 
These renewed efforts were based on stocktaking performed by the Commission in 
201053. The Commission's analysis was widely shared and discussed with EU member 
States, ACP countries and other stakeholders: 
• Slow progress in signing and implementing interim EPAs has restrained mutual trust 
and credibility of the EPA process. 
• The complexity of the issues and the lack of ACP experience and capacity in dealing 
with regional trade negotiations are important factors to explain the state of play. 
However, the situation also raises the question of ownership and commitment to the 
EPAs.  
• Low commitment to trade liberalisation, even on an asymmetrical and progressive 
basis to be completed over several years. 
This narrative applies to different ACP regions to different degrees. The guiding 
principles for the EPA negotiations established in the 2002 Communication were not a 
sufficiently strong foundation on which to agree concrete provisions for development-
friendly trade agreements. In several instances, the reality of regional integration 
processes was not sufficiently advanced, both politically among the countries concerned 
and capacity-wise. Equally, the need for WTO compatibility proved to be insufficient 
motivation to complete negotiations and apply agreements within a reasonable 
timeframe. 
The Commission proposed some remedial action: reconfirming the commitment to the 
EPAs, increasing dialogue to reinforce mutual trust, greater flexibility in negotiations, 
progressing towards regional AfT packages and securing market access arrangements 
compliant with WTO law and fair to all EU trade partners. At the Joint Ministerial Trade 
Committee meeting, on 22 October 2010, the ACP partners made a number of requests to 
the EU, which in their view needed to be addressed to allow negotiations to be 
                                                 
51 Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar and Mozambique signed an EPA while Burundi, the Comoros, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia initialled such an agreement but have not yet signed it. 
52 Congo Rep (Brazzaville), Gabon, Nigeria and seven Pacific islands 
53 Cf. EPA Reflection Paper of 22 October 2010 
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concluded: more flexibility on outstanding issues, more financial support, lowering 
requirements for LDCs, supporting on-going regional integration processes, and 
maintaining, or even extending, market access under MAR. Requests that can be 
addressed in the context of ongoing negotiations are being thoroughly looked into. 
On 30 September 2011, the Commission adopted a proposal to amend MAR that would 
maintain trade preferences for the 18 beneficiaries that have so far taken necessary steps 
towards ratification; Nine more ACP countries are LDCs and are therefore eligible for 
EBA treatment. The remaining nine countries are non-LDCs, of which two are upper 
middle-income countries: Botswana and Namibia. In order to maintain or, after 
exclusion, re-obtain duty free and quota free access into the EU market, countries have to 
either notify the EU of the application, final or provisional, of the EPA negotiated in 
2007, or to conclude the ongoing negotiations for a regional or more comprehensive 
EPA. Failing this, they would have to rely, if eligible, on the GSP, thus still enjoying 
substantial duty reductions on many products, although not all. The proposal gives the 
countries concerned enough time to apply existing EPAs and/or conclude ongoing 
negotiations, as it would not take effect before 2014.  
 
9. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE COOPERATION OUTSIDE THE ACP REGION 
In 2006, with the Global Europe strategy, the Commission reoriented the European 
bilateral trade agreements perspective through a new generation of FTAs with Asian 
markets and enhanced Europe's focus on key areas such as intellectual property and 
access to raw materials. ASEAN, Korea, and MERCOSUR emerged as priorities as they 
combine high levels of protection with large market potential and they are active in 
concluding FTAs with the EU's competitors. 
In this perspective, FTAs were seen as important tools to build on WTO and other 
international rules and to go further and faster in promoting openness and integration, by 
tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion, and by preparing the 
ground for the next level of multilateral liberalisation. Many key issues, including 
investment, public procurement, competition, other regulatory issues, IPR enforcement 
and sustainable development, which remain outside the WTO, could be addressed 
through FTAs. 
The 2010 Trade, Growth and World Affairs Communication confirmed that, although 
remaining strongly committed to multilateralism and to completing the DDA, the Global 
Europe agenda was the right course for Europe to follow, as it gives the EU the 
possibility to take account of the differing levels of development of our trading partners 
and to include under these new trade agreements new areas such as regulatory barriers in 
goods, services and investment, IPRs, government procurement, the protection of 
innovation, sustainable development and other important issues. 
9.1. The Mediterranean 
The EU has a healthy trade relationship with Mediterranean countries and trade flows are 
increasing under the association agreements. The EU is the main trading partner for 
Southern Mediterranean countries, representing their primary source of imports and their 
largest market for exports. Euro-Mediterranean total trade was €141 billion in 2010, 
excluding Turkey and Libya. EU exports to Southern Mediterranean countries accounted 
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for €80 billion whereas Southern Mediterranean countries exports to the EU represented 
around €60 billion. This represents almost 7% of total EU external trade, and more than 
40% of total Southern Mediterranean trade. 
Bilateral trade relations are governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements concluded between the EU and each Southern Mediterranean partner (with 
the exception of Libya and Syria). These agreements, which cover essentially trade in 
goods, are being or have been supplemented by a number of additional negotiations:  
• Negotiations to open up additional agricultural trade: Negotiations have been 
concluded with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority. They 
will soon be re-launched with Tunisia. 
• Negotiations to liberalise trade in services and establishment: Negotiations are on-
going with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel. A scoping process prior to launching 
negotiations has been finalised with Jordan. Progress has been limited in these 
negotiations, except in the case of Morocco.  
• Negotiations to establish bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms for trade matters: 
Protocols have been signed with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Negotiations are on-going with the Palestinian Authority. 
• Preparations for the negotiation of agreements on conformity assessment and 
acceptance of industrial products: the first agreement was signed with Israel in 2010. 
Discussions are ongoing with other Southern Mediterranean countries, aiming at 
launching negotiations as soon as possible. If the pace of preparation is sustained, 
negotiations could start in 2012 with Egypt and Tunisia, and in 2013 with Morocco 
and Jordan. 
Following the signature of the single regional convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
rules of origin on 15 June, the EU must ensure a rapid revision of Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean preferential rules of origin, to be based as much as possible on the 
recently reformed rules of origin for GSP beneficiaries.  
Deepening South-South economic integration is essential for establishing a fully-
fledged Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and increasing the economic potential for 
the Southern Mediterranean region as a whole. Southern Mediterranean partners are still 
in the process of setting up a network of free trade agreements with each other, but 
significant progress has been made. The Agadir Agreement (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, 
and Egypt) has been in place since 2007 and open to other Arab Mediterranean countries. 
In addition, a number of free trade agreements have been concluded by Israel and by 
Turkey with Southern Mediterranean partners and other free trade agreements are being 
negotiated.  
Possible avenues to further develop and deepen our trade and investment relations 
with our Southern Mediterranean partners, as a response to the unprecedented events 
across the Arab world since February 2011, were set out in the Joint Communications of 
March and May 201154 as well as in the European Council conclusions of March and 
                                                 
54 Joint Communications from the European Commission and the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 8 March 2011 “A partnership for democracy and shared 
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June 2011. In the short to medium term, the focus is on accelerating the conclusion of 
agreements, on-going negotiations, or preparations for negotiations.  
Going beyond existing mandates, and following the invitation by the June Foreign 
Affairs Council, the Commission has submitted to the Council a proposal for negotiating 
directives for bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The main objective of future DCFTA negotiations 
would be the progressive integration of the economies of these partners into the EU 
single market. DCFTAs, which would form part of the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements, would aim at improving market access opportunities and the investment 
climate and at supporting economic reforms undertaken by Southern Mediterranean 
partners. They would be covering a full range of regulatory areas of mutual interest, such 
as trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
investment protection, public procurement, competition policy and sustainable 
development. Nonetheless, a realistic, balanced and flexible approach to regulatory 
convergence would need to be applied in the negotiations, taking into account the 
different economic development and regulatory priorities of Southern Mediterranean 
partners.  
In parallel, work continues on implementing concrete initiatives to bring the Euro-
Mediterranean trade partnership closer to economic operators, following the 
conclusions of the 9th Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in 2010. 
These efforts include: 
• Establishing an information tool on trade and investment conditions in the Euro-
Mediterranean region: this tool is likely to be in place from 2012. 
• Strengthening Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation across sectors and in sectors 
of interest to both sides of the Mediterranean: a meeting of experts will take place in 
early 2012.  
• Enhancing cooperation with the Euro-Mediterranean business community: a 
consultation process on trade and investment initiatives for the region is likely to be 
launched before the end of the year. 
• Reinforcing cooperation in the area of the fight against piracy and counterfeiting: a 
regional workshop will be organised in the coming months. 
The next Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference will take place in the first 
half of 2012 and will assess progress made in implementing actions in all of these areas. 
9.2. Eastern Neighbourhood Countries 
In March 2007, the EU and Ukraine launched bilateral negotiations of a new Association 
Agreement to replace the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that dates from 
1998. An FTA will be embedded in the new Association Agreement as an integral 
element alongside others, such as political, social, and sectoral co-operation. It should be 
the first of a new generation of deep and comprehensive FTAs, covering all trade-related 
areas, including services, intellectual property rights, customs, public procurement, 
                                                                                                                                                 
prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" (COM(2011)200) and on 25 May 2011 "A new response to a 
changing Neighbourhood" (COM(2011)303). 
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energy-related issues, competition, sustainable development, etc., as well as deep 
regulatory approximation with the trade-related EU 'acquis'. The EU believes that closer 
economic integration with the EU can be a key factor for Ukraine's economic growth. 
The EU is Ukraine's foremost commercial partner and accounts for about one third of its 
external trade. In 2010, EU exports to Ukraine amounted to €17.3 billion while EU 
imports from Ukraine amounted to €11.4 billion. Ukraine's main exports to the EU are 
iron, steel, mining products, agricultural products, and machinery. EU exports to Ukraine 
are dominated by machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, and agricultural products. 
EU investment stocks in Ukraine were worth €19.8 billion in 2008. Between 2007 and 
2008, FDI outward stocks from EU Member States in Ukraine grew by more than 10%. 
In 2009, EU investments into Ukraine amounted to €3.4 billion.  
Ukrainian exports to the EU are to a very large extent liberalised as Ukraine has 
benefited from the EU's GSP since 1993. In 2010, the GSP utilisation rate reached a level 
of 72.2% of the eligible products. With € 2.15 billion of GSP preferential imports to the 
EU, Ukraine ranks 12th among the most effective users of the system. Preferential 
imports include machinery and mechanical appliances, plants, oils, base metals, 
chemicals and textiles. 
The EU has been a strong proponent of Ukraine's WTO membership, effective on 16 
May 2008. In joining the WTO, Ukraine benefits from secure access to the markets of all 
WTO members and commits to providing the kind of stable trade and investment 
environment that will attract further trade and investment. 
After a breakthrough reached during a ministerial meeting on 19 October 2011, the FTA 
negotiations with Ukraine are in their final stage. 
Good progress has also been made in negotiating an Association Agreement with the 
Republic of Moldova and significant progress has been made in negotiating association 
agreements with the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia. On 5 
December 2011, the EU decided to launch negotiations on the DCFTA part of the 
association agreements with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. The first round of 
negotiations is to take place in early 2012. Building on the substantial work 
accomplished, Armenia is pursuing its efforts to become ready for DCFTA negotiations 
as soon as possible. 
9.3. China 
Since joining the WTO in December 2001, China has emerged as the world's third largest 
economy and the world's leading exporter, as well as increasingly an important political 
power. EU-China trade has grown dramatically in recent years. China is now the EU's 
second trading partner after the USA and the EU's largest source of imports by far. The 
EU is also China's main trading partner. EU goods imports from China amounted to 
€281.9 billion in 2010, and EU goods exports to China amounted to €113.1 billion. As 
for EU services imports from China, they amounted to €16.3 billion in 2010, while EU 
services exports to China reached €20.2 billion. Regarding FDI, EU inward investment to 
China was worth €4.9 billion in 2010, compared to €0.9 billion for China inward 
investment to the EU. 
The domestic reforms undertaken by China in the run-up to and shortly after WTO 
accession set the country on long-term growth trajectory, and this in turn enabled China 
to lift hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty. The EU's open market has been a 
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large contributor to China's export-led growth. The EU has also benefited from the 
growth of the Chinese market and the EU is committed to open trading relations with 
China. Through the 2006 European Commission Communication on "EU-China: Closer 
partners, growing responsibilities55," the EU pledged to accept tough Chinese 
competition while pushing China to trade fairly, respect intellectual property rights and 
meet its WTO obligations. A number of EU-China dialogues at all levels have been 
established to this end. 
Because of the cross-cutting nature of many of the issues that arise in the relationship, 
the EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED) was launched in Beijing 
in April 2008. The HED strengthens the dialogue between the European Commission and 
the State Council of China, at Vice-Premier level. It deals with issues of strategic 
importance to EU-China trade and economic relations and provides impetus to progress 
concretely in sectoral dialogues. This dialogue provides a tool to address issues of mutual 
concern in the areas of investment, market access, intellectual property rights protection, 
government procurement as well as other trade-related issues. 
In January 2007 the EU and China launched negotiations on a comprehensive 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The aim is to further improve the 
framework for bilateral trade and investment relations and also to upgrade the 1985 EC-
China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement. However, positions remain far apart 
on many important chapters, and the European Commission has called upon China to 
demonstrate more ambition. 
The EU was a strong supporter of China's accession to the WTO, as a WTO without 
China was not truly universal in scope. The commitments made by China in the context 
of accession to the WTO secured improved access for EU firms to China's market. 
Import tariffs and other non-tariff barriers were sharply and permanently reduced. At the 
8th WTO Ministerial in December 2011, China announced its readiness to offer duty-free 
quota-free access to 97% of its market to LDCs and has expressed interest in acceding to 
the General Procurement Agreement. However, while China has made good progress in 
implementing its WTO commitments, there are still outstanding problems. China's 
compliance with the commitments it undertook when joining the WTO was periodically 
reviewed in a process called the Transitional Review Mechanism. This process ended in 
December 2011, 10 years after China's WTO accession,. The EU also uses the regular 
Trade Policy Review of China in the WTO to raise a number of concerns regarding 
China's trade policy. These include inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, 
the maintenance of industrial policies which may discriminate against foreign companies 
especially in sectors like automobiles, barriers to market access in a number of services 
sectors including construction, banking, telecommunications, and express postal 
services), and sustainable development. Export restrictions on raw materials have also 
been identified as a major trade obstacle.  
9.4.  South Asia 
India is an important partner for the EU, in both strategic and economic terms. In 2004, 
India became one of the EU's "strategic partners". Since 2005, the EU-India Joint Action 
Plan, revised in 2008, aims at realising the full potential of this partnership in key areas 
of interest to India and the EU. The relationship is underpinned by an institutional 
                                                 
55 COM (2006) 631 final of 24 October 2006. 
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framework, cascading down from the annual EU-India Summit, to a senior-official level 
Joint Committee, to the Sub-Commission on Trade and to working groups on technical 
issues such as technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(SPS), agricultural or industrial policy. These are the fora where a number of day-to-day 
issues, such as EU market access problems, are discussed  
For India, the EU is the most important trading partner. India is also a very important 
trading partner for the EU. At present, India is only in 8th place, but its market size of 
more than 1 billion people and growth rates between 7 and 10% make is a growing 
global economic power and one of the most dynamic emerging economies in the world. 
EU goods exports to India amounted to €34.7 billion in 2010 compared to €33.2 billion 
imports from India. EU services exports to India amounted to €9.8 billion in 2010 
compared to €8.1 billion for EU services imports from India. Regarding FDI, EU 
outward investment to India in 2010 totalled €3 billion compared to Indian inward 
investment to the EU of €0.6 billion. India is a beneficiary of the EU's GSP scheme. In 
2010, around 85% of Indian exports to the EU entered under a zero or a preferential 
tariff.  
Although it is far from the closed market that it was 20 years ago, India still also 
maintains substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers that hinder trade with the EU. The EU 
and India therefore hope to increase their trade in both goods and services and 
investment through the ambitious and comprehensive FTA negotiations that they 
launched in 2007. Studies confirm that the benefits to be expected from the FTA will be 
higher the more ambitious the commitments undertaken. This holds true for both sides. 
At the same time, the FTA will take appropriate account of India's development needs, 
notably concerns about livelihood and food security, particularly in the area of 
agriculture, as well as through transition periods for tariff implementation.  
The negotiations have entered a crucial phase and intensive activity is expected ahead of 
the EU-India Summit to be held on 10 February 2012. Concluding this negotiation would 
make this the EU's first substantive FTA with a major emerging economy. 
As for Pakistan, it remains an important partner for the EU in South Asia. Bilateral trade 
continues to increase and now amounts to more that €7 billion. However, due to the 
current concerns regarding the stability in Pakistan and the region as a whole, trade and 
investment continues to be below its potential. In addition, Pakistan was hit in 2010, but 
also in 2011, by severe floods resulting in a serious impact on Pakistan's economy. As a 
response, the European Council in September 2010 agreed on a package of measures to 
assist in the recovery of Pakistan's economy. One element of this package is the granting 
of time-limited trade preferences on a number of goods imported into the EU from 
Pakistan. The EU is currently working with members of the WTO to obtain the 
respective WTO waiver to allow the EU to adopt a Regulation implementing these 
preferences.  
9.5. ASEAN 
From an economical point of view, the ASEAN region holds considerable potential for 
EU exporters and vice versa. Therefore, it is important for the EU to remain committed 
to strengthening the trade relationship with ASEAN as a region. To this end, the EU 
presented during consultations in Da Nang between the EU and ASEAN Economic 
Ministers (AEM) in August 2010, a paper containing a package of activities to re-launch 
the trade dialogue between the EU and ASEAN as a region. These activities have now 
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been translated into an ASEAN-EU trade and investment work programme endorsed 
during the last ministerial meeting held in Jakarta in May 2011. The overall objective of 
this work programme is to enhance economic cooperation so as to be able to address 
emerging challenges and opportunities for trade and investment between ASEAN and the 
EU. Moreover, this work programme is also expected to support ASEAN economic 
integration, bringing broader economic integration within ASEAN as well as between the 
EU and ASEAN. 
Furthermore, and in parallel to this EU-ASEAN region-to-region trade dialogue, the EU 
and ASEAN countries have moved towards closer ties by opening FTA negotiations with 
Singapore and Malaysia, and the door remains open to other ASEAN partners wishing to 
share EU ambitions for negotiating a comprehensive FTA. Other ASEAN members, in 
particular, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have expressed great 
interest in also starting FTA negotiations. These bilateral FTAs are however intended to 
become building blocks for a future agreement in the regional framework. It is clear that 
the more similar these FTAs are, the easier it will be to weld them into a regional 
framework. 
9.6. Central America 
At the EU-Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Summit in 2004, the EU and the Central 
American region agreed to negotiate a new Association Agreement. Like the existing 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, this new agreement would aim at 
reinforcing the political and economic stability of the Central American countries56, 
fostering sustainable development and deepening their process of regional integration. 
This closer economic integration between the countries of the Central American region is 
important for attracting investment to the region and helping local businesses develop the 
strength in their regional market to compete internationally.  
Negotiations on this Association Agreement were launched in 2007 and were 
successfully concluded at the 2010 Madrid EU-LAC Summit. The Agreement was 
initialled in March 2011. It sets the appropriate framework for the further development of 
bi-regional relations through political dialogue, cooperation and trade. The Association 
Agreement includes a balanced and ambitious trade component. 
In 2008, the EU was the second major trade partner of the region after the United States 
with a stable market share - over the last decade - of approximately 10%. Central 
American exports to the EU are dominated by agricultural products, especially coffee, 
bananas and other fruits, which together accounted for 36% of exports to the EU in 2007. 
The most important exports from the EU to Central America are machinery, chemicals, 
ships, boats, vehicles and fuels. EU goods exports to Central America amounted to €4.2 
billion in 2009 while EU goods imports from Central America amounted to €4.6 billion. 
9.7. MERCOSUR 
Negotiations for an inter-regional Association Agreement between the EU and 
MERCOSUR57 were launched in 1999 but were suspended in October 2004. In 2009 and 
2010, the EU and MERCOSUR conducted a process of informal contacts to take stock of 
the situations and assess if the conditions for a successful re-launch of the negotiations 
                                                 
56 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
57 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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now existed. Taking into account the results of this informal dialogue, the Commission 
decided in May 2010 that it should be possible to re-launch the negotiations. 
The negotiations are based on a region-to-region approach and aim at an ambitious and 
balanced result, going beyond the respective WTO obligations of both sides. The EU-
MERCOSUR FTA would have an extensive coverage, although product and sectoral 
sensitivities on both sides would be taken into account. It would cover not just goods, but 
also services, investment, government procurement, adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights and geographical indications, effective competition policies, SPS as well 
as trade and sustainable development. The FTA would also establish an effective and 
binding dispute settlement mechanism to help resolve trade differences. 
In 2009, EU-MERCOSUR trade represented nearly as much as EU trade with the rest of 
Latin America put together. In 2008, the EU was MERCOSUR's largest trading partner, 
representing 20.7% of total MERCOSUR trade. MERCOSUR ranked 8th among EU 
trading partners, accounting for 2.7% of total EU trade in 2009. The EU is 
MERCOSUR's leading market for its agricultural exports, accounting for 19.8% of total 
EU agricultural imports in 2009. EU goods exports to MERCOSUR focus largely on 
industrial products including machinery, transport equipment and chemicals, accounting 
for €27.2 billion in 2009, while goods imports amounted to €35.1 billion. The EU is the 
largest investor in MERCOSUR with €167.2 billion in 2008. It currently has more FDI 
stock in MERCOSUR than in Russia, China and India put together.  
9.8. Andean Community 
The EU is the second largest trading partner of the Andean region after the USA. In 
2010, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) represented 0.7% of the EU's world 
trade whereas the EU totalled 14% of CAN's trade (2009). In 2010, EU imports from 
Andean countries amounted to €12.2 billion and consisted predominantly of primary 
products: agricultural products (41.1%) as well as fuels and mining products (44.7%). 
EU exports amounted to €7.9 billion and consisted mostly of manufactured goods 
(81.5%), notably machinery and transport equipment (46.5%) and chemical products 
(13.8%). The EU grants the Andean countries preferential access to its market under the 
GSP+. 
Following divergences amongst Andean countries, the EU engaged into FTA 
negotiations with Colombia and Peru which were successfully concluded in the spring of 
2010. The FTA with Colombia and Peru is based on a three-pillar structure including a 
political, a trade and a development cooperation structure. 
The FTA with Colombia and Peru offers first and foremost substantial new access for 
bananas and sugar to the EU market. The new regime for importing these two products 
into the EU under the FTA will trigger significant tariff savings for Colombia and Peru. 
Other products will also benefit from substantial market access increases e.g. beef, rice 
and maize to name a few. These products are not covered by GSP+ and will thus result in 
real benefits directly to local producers. 
Moreover, from its entry into force the FTA covers 100% of Colombia and Peru’s 
exports of industrial products and fisheries, thereby providing an incentive for the 
Peruvian and the Colombian economies to move up the value-added chain and benefit 
from a totally open market in the EU. Conversely, tariff dismantling in Colombia and 
Peru will take place on these products over a period of 10 years, which is in accordance 
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with the asymmetrical approach the EU takes in its FTAs with emerging economies. 
Overall, the FTA is expected to boost Colombian GDP by 1.3% and Peruvian GDP by 
0.7% on the long term. Both imports and exports of these countries are likely to increase 
by 6% in the medium term and by 8% over the long run. 
 
10. KEY INSTRUMENTS FOR BETTER POLICY MAKING: IMPACT ASSESSMENTS, 
SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS AND EX-POST EVALUATIONS 
Impact assessments (ex ante) and evaluations (ex post) are fundamental tools for 
evidence-based trade policy making. Impact assessments provide support for political 
decision-making by analysing and comparing the expected effects of proposed changes 
in trade policy. Ex post evaluations evaluate the actual consequences – both expected 
and unexpected – of changes in trade policy following their implementation and provide 
the evidential basis for fresh initiatives and a new cycle of policy-making.  
10.1. Impact assessments 
In practice, two types of impact assessment are used to support decision-making in trade 
matters: Commission impact assessments (IAs) and trade sustainability impact 
assessments (SIAs). Common to both are a balanced and integrated assessment of 
economic, social and environmental impacts, together with a comprehensive consultation 
of stakeholders .The main differences between the two concern their timing and scope. 
The European Commission, which has a policy of systematic, standardised and highly 
structured impact assessments for all major policy initiatives, is stepping up a gear in 
embedding impact assessments in trade policy making. This includes carrying out impact 
assessments on legislative proposals (regulations) and on proposals for new trade 
negotiations with a potentially significant economic, social or environmental impact on 
the EU and its trading partners, including developing countries. The impact assessments 
analyse whether the options considered might have significant effects on certain sectors 
and assess the possible impact on third countries with which the EU has preferential 
trade arrangements as well as any impacts the initiative might have on developing 
countries. 
Impact assessments are prepared in order to provide the evidential support for a 
Commission decision (i.e. for a trade negotiation, the adoption of a proposal for a 
negotiating directive). They prepare evidence for political decision-makers on the 
advantages and disadvantages of possible policy options by assessing their potential 
impact. They are based on an integrated approach which analyses both benefits and costs, 
and they address all significant economic, social, human rights and environmental 
impacts of the suggested trade initiative. They are accountable and transparent: they 
include a consultation of interested parties and the reports are published online once the 
Commission has adopted the relevant proposal.  
Since 1999, moreover, all the EU's major multilateral, regional or bilateral trade 
negotiations have been accompanied and supported by trade sustainability impact 
assessments (SIAs). Trade SIAs are independent studies conducted by external 
consultants, on the basis of which the Commission sets out its own views on the 
identified impact, and on the policy measures proposed to address them.  
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They consist of two complementary elements: a robust analysis of the potential 
economic, environmental, human rights and social impacts that a trade agreement might 
have, both in the EU and in the partner countries; and a transparent and very wide 
consultation process which ensures a high degree of transparency, aims to engage 
stakeholders both in the EU and in partner countries, and allows the studies to take 
account of the expertise, local knowledge, and concerns of the relevant interest groups, 
including in the partner countries.  
Undertaken in parallel with the negotiation process, SIAs provide negotiators with 
evidence-based information to help clarify the trade-offs arising. They provide diverse 
groups of stakeholders with a more extended opportunity to bring their concerns to the 
attention of the negotiators. They also provide guidelines for the design of possible 
flanking (complementary) measures (e.g. AfT), which can maximise the positive impact 
and reduce any negative impacts of the trade negotiations in question. 
Impact assessments can help gain a better understanding of what is at stake in trade 
agreements. They can help identify potential risks but also pursue effective trade policies 
leading to sustainable development and inclusive growth. The EU is the only trade 
partner with such an extensive and systematic practice of impact assessments. 
10.2. Ex post evaluations 
But it is also important to ensure that the trade policy delivers its intended benefits. Since 
1996, Commission services have been examining how effectively budgetary resources 
are being used.  More recently, the focus has shifted towards the question of whether, 
and to what extent, EU initiatives are achieving their policy objectives. 
In trade matters, an example of this type of unified cycle of policy analysis is the 
evaluation of the EU's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) which provided the 
evidence base for the review of the GSP scheme. 
The ex post evaluation of trade policy activities has gradually increased, year after year; 
and in Trade, Growth and World Affairs (COM(2010)612), the European Commission 
specifically committed to more systematic evaluation of the effects of the EU's existing 
trade agreements. In 2010 an evaluation of the effects of the trade pillar of the EU-Chile 
association agreement was launched58, and further studies are planned. 
 
11. INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
11.1. International rules on investments in EU trade agreements 
Investors thrive in a stable, sound and predictable environment. An attractive domestic 
environment, notably as far as the regulatory framework, infrastructure, human capital, 
domestic policies and the political situation are concerned, is essential to attract FDI flows. 
International rules on investment contribute to improving the business environment by 
increasing legal certainty for investors and by reducing the perceived risk. These rules are 
                                                 
58 Another study provides analysis of social impacts resulting from trade pillar of the EU-Chile Association 
Agreement; Ergon Associates, 2011, 'Trade and Labour: Making effective use of trade sustainability 
impact assessments and monitoring mechanisms'. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=87 
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laid down at the multilateral level through the WTO-GATS and at regional and bilateral 
level through FTAs.  
The EU has concluded FTAs with a variety of developing countries. The objective of 
provisions in these FTAs can notably be to facilitate and strengthen trade in services and 
investments, by giving investors greater legal certainty regarding market access and the 
conditions under which they are allowed to operate. However, such commitments in EU 
economic agreements with developing countries do not force any developing country to 
open sectors that they deem not ready to be opened. 
Liberalisation of trade in services and investments is much more complex than 
liberalisation of trade in goods, which is mainly a matter of lowering customs tariffs. 
Because of this, FTAs with developing countries do not seek to open up all sectors in a 
uniform manner. Parties can choose and define which sectors they want to liberalise and 
by how much, in compliance with WTO rules. Similarly as in the goods area, 
liberalisation of trade in services and investments in FTAs with LDCs is asymmetric, 
with the EU opening up its market to a significantly larger extent than LDCs.  
11.2. New comprehensive EU international investment policy 
The Lisbon Treaty has included FDI within the EU Common Commercial Policy, which 
is an exclusive competence of the EU. In its Communication 'Towards a comprehensive 
European international investment policy' of 7 July 201159, the Commission has outlined 
the objectives of the EU's future investment policy. It is the Commission's objective to 
develop and implement a comprehensive common investment policy, which will secure a 
level playing field for all EU investors, offering them not only access to foreign markets 
but also a high degree of protection for their investment abroad.  
This new policy will aim to secure and strengthen the EU's investment competitiveness 
and to affirm the EU's commitment to the open investment environment which has been 
fundamental to its own prosperity, while continuing to promote investment for 
sustainable development. Besides rules regarding liberalisation of investments, the EU 
aims to include in its economic agreements, rules regarding the protection of 
investments. This is a crucial feature to attract FDI, as it provides more guarantees and 
increases legal certainty for investors, on top of rules regarding access to foreign 
markets.  
A key objective of the EU Common Commercial Policy is to promote trade and 
investment in such a way as to contribute to sustainable development. This equally 
applies to the future EU investment policy.  
The EU international investment policy will be consistent with the other policies of the 
EU and its Member States, including development, human rights, protection of the 
environment, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, 
competition and taxation. EU agreements relating to investment will include 
sustainability provisions, as is already the case under the EU's FTAs. Investors have to 
recognise and respect these principles and objectives when investing in foreign countries. 
In this respect, policies encouraging responsible business conduct play an important role.  
                                                 
59 COM(2010)343 final 
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11.3. EU policy on Corporate Social Responsibility 
The Commission published a new Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) in October 201160 which aims at setting out a renewed EU strategy in response to 
recent developments in this area. Further take-up of CSR is a critical element to achieve 
sustainability, as value chains spread globally and criteria other than financial profit, 
including social and environmental costs and benefits, are increasingly considered by 
investors and decision-makers as indicators of overall performance and the 'shared value' 
generated by a company. The Commission's new Communication places a strong 
emphasis on the need to respect and promote internationally recognised CSR guidelines 
and principles.  
The Commission, along with 21 EU members in the OECD, contributed to the recent 
update of the 'OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises: recommendations for 
responsible business conduct in a global context'. The Guidelines now incorporate a 
chapter on business and human rights, integrating the 'Guiding Principles for the 
implementation of UN framework on business and human rights'. They also introduce a 
new comprehensive approach to due diligence and responsible supply chain 
management, updated wording on employment and industrial relations, combating 
bribery, the environment, consumer interests, disclosure and taxation, as well as 
reinforced procedural guidance strengthening the implementation mechanism. Finally, 
the update of the OECD Guidelines also includes a proactive implementation agenda 
aimed at assisting enterprises in meeting their responsibilities as new challenges arise. 
Besides the OECD Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, other internationally recognised CSR guidelines and principles highlighted by the 
Commission are the UN Global Compact, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and social policy, and the ISO 26000 Guidance 
Standard on Social Responsibility. 
Delivering on development policy objectives can be greatly enhanced by companies 
better meeting their social responsibility through best practices, the adoption and 
implementation of industry-specific codes of conduct or reporting standards and the 
development of inclusive business models. This is even more important in weak 
governance countries, where exemplary corporate behaviour of European investors can 
have the positive effect of encouraging local authorities to improve regulatory standards, 
possibly inspired by European formats, and ensuring that local communities are properly 
involved. This plays a role in filling governance gaps. 
 
12. EU SUPPORT FOR INVESTMENT 
EU blending mechanisms combine grants with additional flows featuring different 
financial terms and characteristics (such as loans, risk capital) so as to gain financial and 
qualitative leverage and thereby increase the impact of EU development policy. The idea 
is to use the grant element strategically in order to make investment projects by public or 
commercial financiers financially viable and thereby exerts a leveraged policy impact. 
                                                 
60 "A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility"; COM(2011)681of 25.10.2011. 
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The Commission aims at achieving four main objectives through the use of blending 
mechanisms: 
• Leverage61 additional public and private resources for key investments to pursue EU 
development policy objectives. 
• Increase aid effectiveness. By using the grant element to improve the quality and 
sustainability of investment projects and to speed up processes, blending also has a 
non-financial leverage. Furthermore the careful use of loans can assist in increasing 
financial discipline and ownership compared to exclusively grant receipts in public or 
semi-public investments. 
• Promote donor cooperation and coordination between European aid actors. 
• Increase the visibility of EU development aid and political leverage. 
The EU blending mechanisms intervene in markets to correct the allocation of resources 
in a way that increases social welfare (i.e. development goals). Therefore interventions 
are undertaken very cautiously and are considered case-by-case in order not to distort 
markets in a negative way (e.g. co-financing marketable projects or providing more grant 
money than necessary). Careful consideration is also given to the issue of debt 
sustainability of sovereign borrowers. 
12.1. EU Regional Blending Mechanisms  
Since 2007, four regional blending mechanisms have been set up: the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the Latin 
America Investment Facility (LAIF) and the Investment Facility for Central Asia 
(IFCA). The EU regional blending mechanisms have proven to be an effective and 
efficient way of joining forces to support investments in developing countries. Since 
2007, about €570 million in grants from the EU budget and the European Development 
Fund (EDF) have been committed to about 100 projects in various sectors. Through grant 
co-financing, EU contributions have so far leveraged some €8 billion in loans from 
European finance institutions. This has unlocked investment with a total volume of more 
than €20 billion. Further investment facilities for the other regions are under preparation. 
Grant components in the regional blending mechanisms can take the form of technical 
assistance, direct investment grants, interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees, insurance 
premium, first loss tranche (structured finance) and risk capital. While so far the majority 
of supported projects have been investments in the public or semi-public sector, the 
significance of support to the private sector particularly through risk capital operations 
and risk sharing mechanisms targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is 
increasing. 
In November 2010, the Commission decided to create "Climate Change Windows" 
(CCWs) within all regional blending mechanisms. The CCWs aim to further increase the 
volume of investment projects related to climate change and are to be established in all 
regional blending mechanisms. 
                                                 
61 The financial leverage of a project is defined as the ratio of grant to non-grant investment in a project. 
The possible leverage depends on each project and is limited in certain sectors, in which the 
profitability of projects is rather low, or in countries with high concessionality requirements.  
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12.2. Other EU blending mechanisms 
ACP Investment Facility (IF): Primarily intended to support private sector investment 
projects, the IF is a revolving fund of €3.5 billion (EDF funds) managed by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), supporting investors via loans, equity or guarantee mechanisms. 
The amount of €400 millions in grants is reserved for financing interest rate subsidies 
and technical assistance (technical assistance is currently limited to €40 millions, 10% of 
the grant amount). Since 2003, €290 million from the IF resources have been blended 
with resources from European Development Finance Institutions (EDFIs) dealing with 
the private sector such as FMO, Proparco or DEG under the European Financing Partners 
(EFP) Initiative to finance the private sector in ACP countries. The Commission gives its 
opinion on project proposals before new projects are approved.  
Support for the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment Partnership (FEMIP): 
FEMIP, managed by the EIB, supports the private sector and the creation of an 
investment-friendly environment. The Commission supports FEMIP with €233 million in 
the creation/strengthening of equity resources for SMEs and via technical assistance. 
Each investment has to be submitted to the Commission for approval.  
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF): GEEREF is a 
structured fund-of-funds aiming to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy in 
developing countries. It invests in Private Equity Funds whose investments target SMEs' 
energy efficiency projects. The Commission has made available €75 million to GEEREF. 
So far, the other investors are Norway (€10 million) and Germany (€24 million). The 
EIB/European Investment Fund (EIF) acts as fund manager, but the Commission together 
with the other investors takes the investment decisions as part of the Investment 
Committee. Blending is meant to take place at the level of the private equity funds by 
attracting private investments via the GEEREF investments. In addition private and 
public financiers are also expected to invest directly into GEEREF.  
Finally, it is also worth mentioning the pooling mechanisms set up in the framework of 
the ACP Energy and Water Facilities under the 10th EDF: within each facility, €40 
million have been made available for financing investments in those two sectors, 
capacity building actions or preparatory studies (either via direct investment grants, 
interest rate subsidy or technical assistance). Project proposals are submitted by the EIB, 
Member States development agencies or European development finance institutions.  
12.3. The role of the EIB in investments in developing countries 
The EIB undertakes operations outside the EU in support of EU external policies based 
on unanimous decisions of its Board of Governors, either at its own risk for investment-
grade operations on the basis of Article 16 of its Statute or through an EU budgetary 
guarantee covering risks of a sovereign or political nature. This guarantee is provided by 
means of a mandate (the so called 'external mandate') that takes the form of a decision by 
the Parliament and Council. Most recently, the EU guarantee was renewed by Decision 
No 1080/2011 EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011. 
The external mandate for 2007-2013 currently covers 68 countries and/or territories in 
Pre-Accession, Neighbourhood, Asian and Latin American countries as well as the 
Republic of South Africa. 
EIB activities in ACP countries are carried out under the separate Cotonou Agreement 
with EDF resources and with EIB own resources covered by a guarantee from Member 
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States. In relative terms, the lending activity outside the EU represents about 10% of the 
Bank’s activity. In 2010, projects signed outside the EU amounted to €8.8 billion out of 
an overall EIB financing of €71.8 billion. 
Regional ceilings of the EIB's General Mandate (2007-2013) 
 
A. Pre-accession countries: €9,048 million 
 
B. Neighbourhood and Partnership countries: €13,548 million broken down into the following 
indicative sub- ceilings:  
(i) Mediterranean countries: €9,700 million 
(ii) Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Russia: €3,848 million 
 
C. Asia and Latin America: €3,952 million, broken down into the following indicative sub-
ceilings:  
(i) Latin America: €2,912 million 
(ii) Asia (including central Asia): €1,040 million 
 
D. Republic of South Africa: €936 million 
 
Climate Change Mandate: €2,000 million 
 
TOTAL: €29,484 million 
 
13. EU SUPPORT TO IMPROVING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE 
TO CRISES 
Crises, in particular natural disasters, conflicts – often linked to the control of natural 
resources – and commodity price shocks, can jeopardise developing countries' long-term 
development efforts. The European Commission has launched its own initiatives to help 
developing countries address these issues and supports a number of promising 
international initiatives that promote good governance and transparency in the natural 
resources sector. Sustainable management of natural resources offers great potential to 
contribute to poverty alleviation, inclusive growth and sustainable development. In 
several developing countries, however, the extraction and processing of natural resources 
have been associated with the misuse of revenues, economic setbacks, environmental 
destruction, political conflict and state fragility. The evidence from many resource-rich 
countries shows that they are performing lower on the human development indicators 
than less-endowed countries, an underperformance referred to by the term "resource 
curse". 
13.1. Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
Forests are a vital resource for many developing countries contributing to the livelihoods 
of the majority by providing food and raw materials for subsistence and supporting the 
local economy. Wood fuel is often the main source for all domestic and industrial uses. 
At the same time, illegal logging is a major problem for many timber-producing 
countries. Illegal logging slows down sustainable development in some of the poorest 
countries of the world and is a major contributor to global deforestation. Consumer 
countries contribute to these problems by importing timber and wood products without 
ensuring that they are legally sourced. In recent years, however, producer and consumer 
countries alike have paid increasing attention to illegal logging.  
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The Commission's Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) was endorsed by Council in 2003. The Action Plan blends measures in 
producer and consumer countries to facilitate trade in legal timber, and eliminate illegal 
timber from trade with the EU. It proposes support for timber producing countries, 
efforts to develop multilateral collaboration to tackle trade in illegal timber, support for 
private sector initiatives as well as measures to avoid investment in activities that 
encourage illegal logging. 
The cornerstone of the Action Plan is the establishment of voluntary FLEGT Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements (VPA) between the EU and timber producing countries aimed at 
stopping illegal logging. FLEGT VPAs are bilateral trade agreements which aim to 
guarantee that the wood exported to the EU is from legal sources and to support partner 
countries in improving their own regulation and governance of the sector. 
Six countries have concluded a VPA with the EU and are implementing the systems 
agreed: Ghana, Indonesia, Cameroon, Congo, Central African Republic and Liberia. In 
addition, four countries are presently negotiating VPAs with the EU: Gabon, Vietnam, 
Malaysia and the DRC. Furthermore, there are around 15 countries from Africa, Asia and 
Central and South America that have expressed interest in a VPA.  
Key facts about forests and illegal logging: 
- Some 1.2 billion people, a fifth of the world’s population, depend on forests for their 
livelihoods. 
- Global deforestation still occurs at an alarming rate of 13 million hectares a year. Deforestation 
is responsible for half of the CO2 emissions from developing countries and account for close to 
20% of global emissions, more than the entire global transport sector. Illegal logging is one of the 
main drivers of deforestation.  
- Studies suggest that 20-40% of trade from tropical countries has been illegally harvested timber. 
Some $15 billion of revenues are lost every year due to illegal logging. Furthermore it is 
estimated that illegal logging depresses timber prices by 16%. 
- The EU is one of the largest consumers of timber in the world. In 2007, the EU imported the 
equivalent of 180 million m3 of timber for a value of $40 billion.  
 
In addition to the FLEGT VPA, in 2010 a new Regulation was adopted, Regulation (EU) 
995/2010 – also known as the EU Timber Regulation. The Regulation obliges EU 
operators placing timber and timber products to exercise "due diligence" so as to 
minimise the risk of illegal timber being present in the supply chain. It applies to both 
EU and imported timber and will apply from March 2013. FLEGT-licensed timber is 
explicitly recognised as complying with the requirements of the Regulation,   
Taken together with development cooperation support from the Commission and EU 
Member States, as well as of course investments of financial and human resources by 
timber exporting countries, these represent a major effort to ensure the legality of timber 
in international trade, a basic precondition for sustainable forest management. 
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13.2. European Commission proposal on mandatory disclosure requirements for 
the extractive and logging industry 
On 25 October 2011, the Commission adopted legislative proposals62 requiring the 
disclosure of payments on a country-and-project basis by listed and large unlisted 
companies with activities in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining) and logging of 
primary forests. The EC proposal would apply to EU privately-owned large companies 
and companies listed in the EU that have activities in the oil, gas, mining or logging 
sectors. Targeting both types of companies would create a level playing field in the EU. 
It reflects the fact that large unlisted companies can potentially make significant 
payments to governments in the countries in which they operate. 
Both extractive and forestry industries are often associated with a great source of wealth 
in resource-rich developing countries. By disclosing payments to governments by the 
extractive and forestry industries, communities in resource-rich countries would be better 
informed about government income and from licensing such activity and whether the 
cost to society from exploited the natural resource is adequate.  
In order to cover the various types of companies active in these industries, the 
Commission proposed to revise both the Transparency Directive63 to cover listed 
companies and the Accounting Directives64 to cover large unlisted companies. During 
the next months, both the European Parliament and the EU Council will consider the 
legislative proposal, and both bodies must be in agreement for it to be approved. 
13.3. The Kimberley Process 
In 2003, the EU became a founding member of the Kimberley Process (KP), the UN-
backed international initiative to combat ‘conflict diamonds’ that fuelled horrific civil 
wars in Africa.. The EU has adopted Regulation (EU) n° 2368/2002 setting out detailed 
rules for implementation of the KP’s certification scheme that aims at preventing 
diamond trade from funding conflict. The KP’s efforts to promote traceability of 
diamond production and trade have proved remarkably successful, and have contributed 
to reducing drastically the occurrence of ‘conflict diamonds’. Furthermore, the 
Kimberley Process’ emphasis on good governance and transparency has helped stabilise 
fragile countries and has supported development.  
The EU has actively contributed to the Kimberley Process, which it chaired in 2007. the 
EU continues to chair the KP’s Monitoring Working Group, provides statistical expertise 
and satellite imagery to strengthen KP’s implementation, and has supported KP 
implementation in countries such as Liberia or Ghana through technical assistance. KP 
implementation, however, remains a challenge, and there have been calls for a wide-
ranging reform of the KP, in particular as far as its focus on ‘conflict diamonds’ is 
concerned.  
                                                 
62  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/other_en.htm 
63  Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted 
to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
64  COM (2011) 684 Final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the annual 
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings. 
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13.4. The Vulnerability Flex Mechanism (V-FLEX) 
Unlike developed economies many ACPs do not have sufficiently developed counter-
cyclical fiscal measures or “automatic stabilisers” such as the use of unemployment 
benefits to cushion the impact of a decline in overall demand. Low Income Countries 
(LICs) in particular are highly vulnerable to economic shocks because of the magnified 
impact on incomes and resultant negative effect on poverty indicators. 
In order to reduce the adverse effects of commodity price volatility, the EU designed the 
Vulnerability Flex Mechanism (VFLEX) in early 2009 as a short-term counter-cyclical 
tool to help mitigate the effects of macroeconomic pressure on those ACP countries most 
affected by the global food and financial crises.  
The VFLEX had an allocation of €500 million over the period 2009-2010. Some €236 
million was allocated to 15 eligible ACP economies in 2009 and the balance of €264 
million allocated to 19 eligible ACP countries in 2010. Support was mostly provided as 
additional disbursements of general budget support, with an allocation to help protect 
countries faced with liquidity rather than solvency problems from further economic 
destabilisation. It also avoided cuts in pro-poor or development expenditure. 
This followed the creation of the €1 billion worth EU Food Facility at the end of 2008 
worth and the re-allocation of European Development Fund (EDF) monies in 2008-2009 
under the so-called Envelope B to help them absorb macroeconomic shocks in 2008. 
Whilst it is too early to assess the ex-post impact of VFLEX funding there is a general 
sense that the tool had the desired effect of preventing countries faced with liquidity 
rather solvency problems from further economic destabilisation. In this sense the 
immediate impact as a counter-cyclical measure worked.  
The role of financial instruments in addressing natural disaster and food security 
Financial instrument can play a positive role in relation to natural disasters and food security at 
both micro and at macro levels. However, in developing countries these instruments and the 
financial markets remain in general underdeveloped: 
- Insurance: Traditionally, countries rely on ex-ante accumulation of reserves, or on ex-post 
increase in taxes and/or debt levels and/or ad hoc external donor support to address the cost of 
natural disasters. Providing for disasters by means of insurance secures at least some of the 
needed resources in advance. The experience in advanced economies shows that many natural 
perils are insurable, and markets for disaster risk insurance are well established there. Some other 
countries have also made positive experiences: for instance, a group of Caribbean countries have 
insured themselves against hurricanes, others against earthquakes and some governments have 
"insured" themselves against unfavourable developments of key commodity prices by engaging 
at the futures market. Insurance can also offer a direct (or indirect via the government) financial 
support to farmers following a bad harvest caused by bad weather. Furthermore, by being insured 
against major losses, farmers may more easily make the step out of subsistence farming, by 
buying more inputs and investing in more efficient technology. 
- Capital markets: Two innovations have enhanced the possibilities for passing risk to capital 
markets: the use of parametric insurance triggers and the growth of the catastrophe bond market. 
Examples of parametric insurance are so-called weather derivatives, which link payouts to the 
occurrence of a certain weather event (such as precipitation falling short of certain thresholds). 
As for catastrophe bonds, they are high-yield debt instruments that are usually insurance-linked 
and meant to raise money in case of a catastrophe such as a hurricane, other adverse weather 
conditions or an earthquake. They include a special condition which states that if the issuer 
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(government, insurer or reinsurer) suffers a loss from a particular predefined disaster, then the 
issuer's obligation to pay interest and/or repay the principal is either deferred or completely 
forgiven. 
The EU supports the World Bank's commodity risk management team to develop targeted risk 
management schemes for developing countries. It is also the main donor of the Global Index 
Insurance Facility, managed by the IFC of the World Bank Group, with the aim to make 
parametric weather insurance workable on the ground in developing countries.  
 
 
14. SUSTAINABILITY-BOUND SCHEMES 
Sustainability schemes can be a means to secure a greater share of the value added for 
producers, notably small-holder farmers and cooperatives, in developing countries. Fair, 
ethical and organic products enjoy growing demand by consumers in emerging and 
developed countries. Sustainability-bound production and trade schemes offer a market-
based business model that can contribute to poverty alleviation and be an effective 
strategy to increase the development impact of trade, especially for the poorest and most 
marginalised parts of the population in developing countries.  
14.1. Fair and ethical trade 
The Commission, in its Communication of 5 May 2009 on "Contributing to sustainable 
development: The role of fair trade and nongovernmental trade-related sustainability 
assurance schemes65," recognised the potential contribution to sustainable development 
of fair trade and other trade-related sustainability assurance schemes66. Underlining the 
voluntary nature of such schemes, the Commission has opted for an approach which aims 
not to privilege one scheme above another and to let the private initiatives and the market 
(including through public procurement) do their work. 
Following the 2009 Communication, the Commission undertook a number of initiatives 
in support of fair and ethical trade: 
• Public procurement: Adoption in January 2011 of "Buying social67," a document that 
provides specific guidance to public authorities on how to promote fair and ethical 
trade through their purchasing policies and practices a guide to social considerations 
in public procurement. It encourages contracting authorities to take sustainability 
issues into account in a neutral, non-discriminatory way in their purchasing 
decisions.  
Tackling rural poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Agriculture is one of the most significant sectors of the Palestinian economy and the country’s 11 
million olive trees provide a living for some 100,000 families. To help improve the income of 
some of the more marginal olive farms, the EU funded a three-year project targeted at about 
                                                 
65  COM(2009) 215 final  
66 Other communications have made similar statements, including the 2006 Communication “Making 
Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility” and more recently the 2011 
Communication on “A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for corporate social responsibility” 
67  "Buying Social - A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement" 
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2,400 olive-farming households in 10 villages in the West Bank. The project aimed to improve 
efficiency by providing olive farmers with training on pruning techniques and pest control and 
also improve product quality by clamping down on the rampant adulteration of new oil with old 
oil or the mixture of olive oil with other types of oil. By the end of the project, 467 new farmers 
became certified as organic producers and the area of land dedicated to growing olives using the 
organic system had increased by 338%, well above the target of 200%. Delays in sending 
collected harvests to olive presses were reduced and hygiene at olive presses was improved. A 
number of olive mills in the area were refurbished and provided with spare parts and technical 
training. Production at the farms of certified organic Fairtrade olive oil increased from 112 tonnes 
in the first year to 282 tonnes in the third year of the project. The project has shifted the focus of 
oil farmers in the West Bank from quantity to quality and the main aim is now the extraction of 
high quality olive oil. The project is widely seen as a success with olive oil from the area recently 
taking a number of national and international awards for its quality. 
• Financing: Funding of specific development cooperation programmes has helped 
increasing the participation of small producers in developing countries in various 
schemes, such as 'Fair Trade'. Further support for the uptake and development of fair 
and ethical trade has been provided mainly through: 
o General trade and private sector development support programmes that aim to 
foster an improved business enabling environment or strengthen productive 
capacities and can benefit all private sector actors, including those active in fair 
trade and other sustainability schemes; 
o More targeted trade and private sector development support programmes, 
including pro-poor value chain and responsible supply chain development, 
capacity-building for small holders and producers, development of fair and 
ethical trade product lines, etc.  
o Support for fair and ethical trade in agricultural, rural development and food 
security programmes contributes to poverty reduction, given that the majority of 
poor people live in rural areas and work in agriculture. Support to such 
programmes helps ensure that agricultural development can benefit small 
producers in a sustainable way and protect their rights. 
o Support for non-state actors in the areas of awareness-raising and educational 
activities in EU Member States, activities supporting market transparency of 
voluntary standards schemes in the EU, or impact assessments or development of 
fair and ethical trade activities in developing countries; 
• Policy coherence: The Directorate General for Trade hosts the Commission's fair 
trade focal point. 
EU support for the International Trade Centre (ICT) for transparency in voluntary 
sustainability standards 
The European Commission provides €200,000 worth of support to ITC for the further 
development and dissemination of the Trade for Sustainable Development (T4SD) project, a web 
portal providing free, impartial, comprehensive, up-to-date and comparable information on 
voluntary sustainability standards. The project aims at improving transparency in voluntary 
sustainability standards and strengthening the capacity of policy-makers, producers, exporters 
and buyers to participate in more sustainable production and trade. 
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14.2. Organic production 
Organic farming is a method of agricultural production which uses organic production 
methods and places the highest emphasis on environmental and wildlife protection and, 
with regard to livestock production, on animal welfare considerations. Organic 
production involves holistic production management systems for crops and livestock, 
emphasizing on-farm management practices over off-farm inputs. This is accomplished 
by avoiding, or largely reducing, the use of synthetic chemicals such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, additives and veterinary medicinal products, replacing them, wherever 
possible, with cultural, biological and mechanical methods.  
Under EU rules, farming is considered to be organic if it complies with Regulation 
834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labeling of organic products. The 
EU regulatory system allows for all third country imports to be labelled as organic and 
sold on the EU market either by recognising the equivalence of the non-EU system or by 
approval of control bodies who undertake to certify product as complying with EU rules. 
Developing country imports are mostly managed by approved certifying bodies, both 
international bodies and bodies from developing countries. Within the EU, the 
Commission manages directly labelling schemes for organic farming which are open to 
producers in developing countries. 
The EU accounts for 48% of the world market for organic product and was worth about 
€12 billion at wholesale price in 2009.  
African Union – EU initiative on agricultural quality products 
In order to boost awareness of the potential of organic farming in Africa, the African Union (AU) 
Commission and the European Commission, meeting in June 2011 in the “College-to-College” 
process, agreed to hold a joint workshop on organic farming. The conclusions of the workshop, 
held in Brussels, Belgium, in July 2011, evidenced substantial activity across Sub-Saharan Africa 
in the development of organic farming. In particular, for smallholders using low-input or no-input 
production, the transition to a productive agricultural system using rotation, composting, rotation 
and improved seed, can be accompanied by increasing yields (contrary to the experience in 
developed countries), which offers the perspective of sustainable intensification by conversion to 
organic methods. The workshop also noted the development of the AU’s Ecological Organic 
Action Plan (2011), which provides a blueprint for development of the sector across Africa. 
14.3. Other schemes 
A wide variety of other certification and product assurance schemes operate, in particular 
in the agricultural, fisheries and forestry sectors, to give importers, buyers and consumers 
guarantees about product including from developing countries. Many focus on 
environmental and sustainability criteria, such as carbon emissions, water use, 
sustainable farming, sustainable fishing, or adherence to good agricultural practice (e.g. 
in the use of pesticides).  
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Over 400 private schemes operate in the agricultural sector68 alone, providing 
information to consumers about product characteristics or production attributes, backed 
up by certification. Consumers must be able to have confidence in the labelling claims 
and in 2010, in response to comments from stakeholders, the Commission adopted a 
Communication on agricultural product quality policy69 addressing EU and private 
schemes in the agri-food sector. Concerning private schemes, EU best practice guidelines 
for voluntary certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs70 were 
adopted by the Commission after extensive consultation with stakeholders. The 
guidelines lay down best practice for these schemes including transparency 
recommendations and the need to take account of impacts of schemes on producers in 
developing countries and facilitate their participation in such schemes.  
 
15. MULTILATERAL ASPECTS 
The EU has consistently advocated trade liberalisation and a strong rules-making system 
flanked by a robust dispute-settlement mechanism as a driver for establishing and 
promoting a sound and growth-oriented domestic framework, and for ensuring a level-
playing field in the global trading system. In this context, transparency and monitoring 
the implementation of WTO rules by its members also remains essential (including under 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism). While the system offers substantial opportunities 
for all, the EU has strived to ensure that developing countries, and particularly LDCs, 
effectively benefit from the multilateral system.   
15.1. WTO accession 
One of the indicators of the attractiveness of the multilateral trading system lies in the 
momentum towards membership. Out of the 48 LDCs, 31 have already become WTO 
members. Some 29 countries are currently candidates for WTO membership/applicants 
in negotiations; most of those are developing countries, including 12 LDCs. 
Whilst the EU is convinced that seeking WTO accession is a driver for reforms of 
domestic administrative, regulatory and institutional practices and rules, and creates the 
conditions for benefiting from increasing global trade flows, the EU also acknowledges 
that such a process is often long and demanding. It can constitute a challenge, especially 
for countries facing capacity constraints and having to address policy shortcomings and 
structural weaknesses. The EU has thus constantly showed readiness to respond to 
technical assistance needs in the context of WTO accessions. 
Taking account of the specific needs and challenges faced by LDCs, the EU, along with 
other WTO members, has continuously expressed willingness to streamline and simplify 
the accession process for these countries in a way that both preserves the robustness of 
                                                 
68  See 2010 'Inventory of certification schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs marketed in the 
EU Member States' prepared for the European Commission, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/certification/inventory/inventory-data-aggregations_en.pdf 
69  COM(2009) 234, 28.5.2009 
70  2010/C 341/04, OJ C 341 of 16.12.2010 p.5. 
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the system and responds to their requests for assistance and guidance. This approach, 
clearly set out in the 2002 Communication, has translated into a strong EU support to the 
General Council Decision of 10 December 2002 on the accession of LDCs, against which 
any LDC request for accession is now assessed. Thus, the EU holds the view that, while 
there should be clear commitments in terms of reforms, there is room for a flexible 
approach in terms of commitments on trade in goods and services, and the EU duly 
exercises restraint in that respect. 
15.2. Taking development into account in mainstream WTO work 
Following the Uruguay Round, the WTO agreements provide for a consolidated 
framework for liberalisation and a comprehensive set of rules. The EU believes that these 
ensure that the conditions for fair and balanced competition are in place at a global level, 
but also acknowledges that the implementation of these agreements may create 
difficulties for some developing countries struggling with internal weaknesses. In many 
areas, the WTO agreements already take account of such challenges and include 
commitments to provide assistance to developing countries in order to improve their 
regulatory, administrative and institutional capacity. The EU has been keen to address 
the needs expressed in that context.  
Aid for Trade (AfT) plays a key role in helping developing countries, especially LDCs, 
to improve their trade-related knowledge and capacity in order to make the most of the 
WTO agreements. Beyond technical assistance, developing countries can rely on specific 
– more favourable – provisions allowing for special and differential treatment (SDT) 
enshrined in the various WTO agreements or further developed on the basis of these.  
The EU has taken the position that SDT provides flexibilities that may prove suitable for 
addressing the specific needs of some countries either horizontally or on a case-by-case 
basis. The EU has for instance played a leading role in the intensely negotiated Decision 
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health adopted in 2003 and which establishes a mechanism aimed at allowing 
poorer countries to benefit from generic versions of patented drugs. Likewise, the EU 
was actively engaged in the negotiation leading to the adoption in 2004 and revision in 
2009 of a Procedure to Enhance Transparency of Special and Differential Treatment in 
Favour of Developing Country Members under the WTO Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. So far, the EU has also be the only one to put 
this provision into practice.  
This being said, while flexibilities remain a useful tool, practice raises the issue as to 
why they have been used so little. For instance, the system established under the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was used only once, while no 
member has had recourse so far to the Procedure to Enhance Transparency in the SPS 
field. 
15.3. Intellectual Property Rights and development 
While the majority of existing IP rights (IPRs) are held in developed countries, 
developing countries, in particular emerging economies, are fast redressing the balance 
of ownership, thus making IPRs increasingly relevant. Some of the main benefits of IPRs 
in developing countries include the protection of their own intellectual assets, promoting 
foreign investment, safeguarding jobs and tax revenues, and combating risks regarding 
health and safety. As in developed countries, the situation in developing countries varies 
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greatly in terms of their innovative potential, the education of their work force, and in the 
structure and funding of research and development. 
Geographical Indications (GIs), which identify and protect the name of a product whose 
quality, reputation or characteristics is essentially attributable to its geographic origin, 
are of particular relevance to developing countries. In addition to providing protection of 
legitimate producers against misuse and imitation, offering the possibility of registering 
GIs encourages diversification of production and related tourism; it can furthermore 
contribute to preserving natural resources, rare plants or breeds and traditional know-
how.  
Marketing under GI-protected labels is a proven way of distinguishing quality products 
in the market place. This assists consumers seeking products linked with their specific 
region of production, and enables producers of authentic product to secure a price 
premium. By linking the attribute with its origin, the GI system also ensures that the 
value added of the label accrues to the original producers in the geographical area. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the regional intellectual property offices are in the process of 
developing and implementing effective GI systems. In addition the African Union 
Commission and the European Commission have launched a joint initiative to boost 
development of GIs in the frame of the AU-EU “College-to-College” process. 
Example of a protected geographical indication: Darjeeling 
In October 2011, the EU registered71 the name ‘Darjeeling’ as a protected geographical indication 
(PGI) to designate tea from gardens situated at an altitude of between 600 and 2,250 metres on 
steep slopes in the district of Darjeeling, in the state of West Bengal, India. The environmental 
factors of the area and the production method, including selective hand harvesting of leaves, 
result in a tea having specific characteristics. The final registration decision of 'Darjeeling' 
clarified that the name only be used as a sales designation for tea that is wholly produced in the 
geographical area in accordance with the specifications. Blends of Darjeeling and other teas may 
not bear the name ‘Darjeeling’ as the sales designation. However, existing users of the 
‘Darjeeling’ name to designate teas not in conformity with the specifications were granted a 
transitional period limited to five years to continue to use the name. The Darjeeling registration 
illustrates how developing country producers can ensure that a product marketed under the 
registered geographical indication corresponds to the specifications laid down by the producers 
themselves.  
The geographical indication system enables producers of a specific and geographically-
linked product in developing countries to exercise some control over the quality, 
handling and marketing of the product in the EU. In particular, the producers collectively 
can ensure that products like coffee and tea sold under the protected name corresponds to 
the quality specification laid down, ensuring the consumer receives the authentic product. 
The Commission's Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 
contains a section on IPR, include the following three targets: 
                                                 
71  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1050/2011 entering a name in the register of protected 
designations of origin and protected geographical indications (Darjeeling (PGI)) OJ L 276, 21.10.2011, 
p.5. 
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− To make better use of IPRs for development, for example to promote investment and 
innovation and to facilitate IPR protection in the EU of export products from 
developing countries. 
− Ensure that balanced IPR provisions (e.g. in bilateral agreements) help developing 
countries to leverage the value of their intellectual creations and to promote 
technological progress, innovation and support domestic and foreign investment. 
− Preserve access to affordable medicine in line with the principles of the Doha 
Declaration and subsequent WTO agreements and EU legislation. 
The Commission incorporates a differentiated approach according to countries' level of 
development, particularly in regard to LDCs. For instance, in examining specific needs 
and requirements in relation to TRIPS implementation, the EU has agreed to give 
favourable consideration to a duly motivated request from LDC Members to extending 
the previously agreed implementation deadline of 1 July 2013, as well as appropriate 
technical assistance. Concerning patents related to pharmaceuticals, the transition period 
under the TRIPS agreement is until 2016 for all LDCs. 
Access to medicines and public health 
It is important to ensure access to medicine, including generics, for developing countries, while 
ensuring incentives for further pharmaceutical research and innovation through the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). To this end, a careful balance needs to be maintained between 
these two objectives. In this respect, the EU played a leading role in the adoption of the WTO 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health in 2001. The EU was also actively involved in the 
negotiation of the WTO Decision of August 2003 on the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration which allows developing countries to grant compulsory licences for the 
production of medicines for export. 
The EU is also the largest provider of resources to support public health policies in developing 
countries In addition, the EU has: 
- Implemented at the EU level the WTO decision allowing the manufacturing and export under 
compulsory licence of generic medicine to developing countries with public health problems and 
without sufficient production capacities, and accepted the Protocol amending the TRIPS 
Agreement to make this solution permanent (Regulation (EC) No 816/2006); 
- Established a tiered pricing mechanism with regard to essential medicines (Council Regulation 
(EC) 953/2003). Price segmentation between developed countries and the poorest developing 
countries is necessary to ensure that the latter are supplied with essential medicines at heavily 
reduced prices; 
- Clarified that clinical trials conducted with a view to the marketing of generic medicines shall 
not be regarded as contrary to patent rights (Directive 2004/27/EC). This facilitates the 
preparation of generic medicine in advance of loss of exclusivity. 
In addition, it is vital to protect public health by preventing the marketing of fake, low quality 
and potentially high risk medicines. 
Last but not least, it shall be noted that EU FTAs do not prevent the other party from using the 
TRIPS flexibilities or, generally, promoting access to medicines. 
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15.4. Effective participation of developing countries 
The progressive transformation of the global system has gone hand in hand with a 
stronger affirmation of developing countries in the WTO decision-making process. While 
"developing countries" – a 'status' based on self-designation – do not constitute a group 
per se, they form the wider part of the WTO constituency and have increasingly 
participated in the work of WTO committees, be it in formal sessions or in more informal 
settings such as small-format consultations. LDCs have organised themselves as a 
distinct group with contributions of its own. This transformation has also been tangible in 
the litigation pillar of the WTO. For instance, from a mostly defensive position upon its 
accession in 2001, China has now become a litigator equivalent to the EU or the US. 
The WTO is one amongst many international organisations where the shift in economic 
power at the global scale has resulted in developing countries gaining a major say. That 
changing picture therefore raises the issue of whether and how to adapt institutions like 
the WTO to new realities in order to maintain the smooth functioning of these entities 
while ensuring that due consideration is given to countries most in need. 
15.5. The Doha Development Agenda 
The EU remains convinced that the completion of the Doha Round remains the best 
avenue for boosting recovery and enhancing growth worldwide. Responses to the 
Commission's on-line public consultation showed broad support for a fast conclusion and 
implementation of the Doha Round. Several respondents also emphasised that the DDA 
and the multilateral level should remain the EU trade policy's priority. 
Trade facilitation 
With production processes becoming deeply intertwined and business competitiveness 
increasingly conditioned by rapid and seamless supply chains, trade facilitation (involving 
measures to simplify and modernise customs and other import and export procedures and 
requirements) has become a core element of any trade-led development strategy. For businesses, 
this is crucial to promote transparency, cut red tape and stop the proliferation of incompatible 
requirements. For governments, trade facilitation provides greater security through more effective 
controls, it improves the investment climate and promotes higher customs revenues72 (which still 
account for a large share of developing countries' fiscal revenues but where losses can exceed 5% 
of GDP because of inefficient border procedures). 
Trade facilitation projects can be extremely effective in this respect: in Burundi, tax revenue 
increased by 25% between 2009 and 2010 after the Burundi Revenue Office was implemented; 
custom reform in Cameroon increased revenue by 12% while the number of declarations assessed 
by officials in a day increased by 130%; in Colombia, the administrative procedure for certifying 
origin was cut down from 2-3 days to ab average of 10 minutes; in Ethiopia, custom reform 
increased import transactions by about 190% and export transactions by 200%, and custom 
revenues increased by 51%; the time needed to register a new business in Mexico went down 
from 34 days to 2.5 hours, eliminating double certification costs of $213 million; in Mongolia, 
data processing modernisation reduced imports clearing time from more than 3 hours to 23 
minutes, and export clearing time from over 2 hours to 13 minutes on average. 
                                                 
72 To be noted that trade agreements do not necessarily lessen tariff revenues. Studies show that the DDA could 
actually increase tariff revenues in Africa thanks to the elimination of prohibitive tariffs and trade volumes 
increases. 
 69 
There is a growing literature showing that trade agreements in their own right (simply by cutting 
tariffs and boosting trade volumes) lead to lower transport costs and trade facilitation 
improvements (a 10% increase in trade volumes reduce transport costs by 0.8%). An agreement 
on trade facilitation as mandated under the DDA offers substantial development benefits by 
ensuring coherent reforms in all WTO members to facilitate trade both domestically and on the 
export markets. While all WTO members stand to benefit, this would be particularly useful for 
developing countries and the landlocked countries among them. Moreover, the ongoing 
negotiations break new ground in respect of special and differentiated treatment. They envisage 
an implementation structure tailored to the individual needs and capacities of each developing 
country and supported, where required, by donor assistance. The EU has provided specific 
support within the framework of the ongoing WTO trade facilitation negotiations including 
regular funding of participation officials from capitals in the meetings of the Negotiating Group 
on Trade Facilitation, a contribution to the need assessment exercise and an ongoing contribution 
to the process of implementation planning with regard to the future Trade Facilitation Agreement 
channelled via the UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Trust Fund.  
In this multilateral negotiation exercise, it was clear from the outset that all members 
were to contribute, just as benefits were expected for all. That said, the Doha Round was 
conceived as a development round, where the development of a consolidated system 
would be combined with appropriate flexibilities for the poorer countries. In line with its 
mandate, the EU has strived for suitable arrangements throughout the negotiations. 
In terms of market access, the EU has for instance supported the development of specific 
modalities for small and vulnerable economies or a specific treatment of livelihood of 
agriculture in the draft Agriculture Modalities. Anticipating and already going beyond 
the implementation of the commitments agreed at the Hong-Kong Ministerial Conference 
in 2005, the EU is one of the few WTO members offering duty-free quota-free access to 
LDCs across the full range of tariff lines. The EU also believes that the new regime of 
rules of origin it has applied to LDC countries since 1 January 2011 under the GSP 
scheme will also greatly contribute to improving their market access. 
 
16. CONCLUSION 
The present Staff Working Paper supports the European Commission's Communication 
on "Trade, growth and development – Tailoring trade policy for those countries most in 
need". 
It illustrates the dramatic transformations that have taken place in the world economy in 
the past decade, with deep implications for trade, investment and development policies. 
Developing countries have undergone radical changes. Some, particularly emerging 
economies, have reaped the benefits of open and increasingly integrated world markets 
and are now amongst the largest and most competitive global economies. Yet others 
continue to lag behind with the associated cost of deeper marginalisation. LDCs in 
particular, most of them in Africa, face many difficulties and are the most off-track to 
achieve the MDGs. 
The Staff Working Paper also illustrates the EU's considerable achievements in 
delivering on its trade-related development commitments. At the same time, it makes it 
clear that more remains to be done, and sometimes differently, to ensure that the EU's 
trade and investment policies for development are fit for purpose for the next decade. 
This notably concerns the need to differentiate among developing countries to focus on 
those most in need, and to improve the way EU instruments deliver. 
